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    In this dissertation, the teaching of happiness through morality courses in 
Mainland China is explored. The exploration centers on three questions: 1) What 
should be taught to students in terms of happiness? 2) Should schools focus on the 
cultivation of voluntary virtue or habituation of virtuous actions? And 3) what is the 
relation between happiness and achievement and/or sacrifice of self-interest? Based 
on both Aristotle’s and Marx’s views on these questions, the author argues that a 
comprehensive rather than a “correct” understanding of happiness should be taught to 
the students. Also, the author suggests that the goal of habituating students to virtuous 
actions is to cultivate voluntary virtue in students, and the habituation itself should not 
be the ultimate goal of moral education. Finally, the author suggests that in order to 
contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of happiness, students should be 
taught how to properly advance self-interest rather than always oppressing the 
concern of self-interest.  
    The structure of this dissertation is as follows: 
    The research purpose and core issues are discussed in the Introduction. Chapter 1 
is a background knowledge of the teaching of happiness in Mainland China and a 
literature review on this topic. Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 focus on Aristotle’s and 
Marx’s views of happiness, respectively. In Chapter 4 Aristotle’s and Marx’s views of 
	  	  
happiness are compared and discussed. Chapter 5 focuses on the implications of both 
the two philosophers’ views of happiness for the teaching practice of happiness in 
Mainland China. Chapter 6 is the conclusion. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In this dissertation, I explore the teaching of happiness in Mainland China, in 
light of both Aristotle and Marx. In the Chinese context, the understanding of 
happiness is generally based on a Marxist view, while the teaching practice is also 
constrained by the government within the Marxist framework. Also, some Confucian 
virtues are integrated into morality course in Mainland China. Based on comparison 
and analyses on both Marx’s and Aristotle’s views on happiness, Confucius’ views if 
necessary, a better understanding of the philosophical foundation of happiness is 
established in the dissertation. Hopefully, a better understanding of happiness will 
contribute to a better practice of the teaching of happiness in Mainland China.  
In Mainland China, moral education, or education in morality, is a particular 
form of education dealing with students’ moral development. Generally, moral 
education in Mainland China deals with the cultivation of the “correct” values and 
virtues in students. Moral education is applied as a particular subject matter as is 
mathematics and Chinese, which are all compulsory courses for students to take. 
Morality courses are provided from elementary school through graduate school, but 
the titles of morality courses vary.  
Since the 1990s, happiness has been included as an important content in morality 
courses in Mainland China. Certain chapters in different morality textbooks are 
devoted to teach students how to be a happy person. Happiness is officially 
interpreted as a certain kind of life only existing in a socialist or communist society; 
and only in a communist society can perfect happiness for all be achieved. Students 
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are taught that in a communist society, everyone’s needs and desires are satisfied, and 
everyone can fully develop his or her talents. As a result, people in a communist 
society lack nothing and are perfectly happy. In addition, happiness is connected with 
virtuous behaviors in morality courses. That is, students are taught that happiness is 
the outcome of certain virtues such as helping others and devoting oneself to 
collectivism. Students are taught that by exercising certain virtues, they will achieve 
happiness. For example, Chinese students are also taught that they should always 
sacrifice self-interest for common interest; this sacrifice is imposed on the students as 
a noble and virtuous action, which would definitely lead to happiness. At the same 
time, the concern of self-interest is viewed as selfishness or egoism. All these 
educational practices regarding the teaching of happiness represent a philosophical 
foundation of happiness in Mainland China, but this philosophical foundation has 
seldom been explored there. 
1. Purpose and Core Questions 
The Chinese government has demonstrated its increasing emphasis on the 
teaching of happiness since decades ago. In order to properly teach happiness in 
Mainland China, several fundamental questions regarding happiness should be fully 
discussed or at least be considered by Chinese scholars and educators. For instance, 
“What is happiness?” “What contributes to a happy life?” “How can happiness be 
achieved?” “Can we really teach people to be happy?” “If we can, by what means?” 
In the Chinese context, the government has regulated answers to these fundamental 
questions, not only in school settings but also in education research. The only “correct” 
	  
	  
	  
3	  
interpretations and principles of happiness, the Marxist view of happiness, are taught 
as irrefutable truth to students. Questioning such truths is not encouraged or even 
allowed by the Chinese government. As a result, these fundamental questions 
regarding happiness have not been fully discussed, or even discussed at all, due to the 
government’s ideological control. Other views on happiness besides the Marxist view 
have rarely been introduced to Mainland China. Research of happiness (some other 
humanity topics as well) has largely been constrained within the Marxist framework 
by the government.  
However, in order to teach happiness, investigation into these fundamental 
questions is necessary. It helps us Chinese educators establish a better philosophical 
foundation for the teaching of happiness and morality. The lack of such a foundation 
may, and has, caused problems in the teaching practice in Mainland China. For 
instance, in educational practice, schools put more stress on habituating students to 
virtuous actions rather than cultivating voluntary virtue in students. That is, whether 
or not students voluntarily exercise certain virtues has been neglected or even 
discouraged, as long as students exercise those virtues in schools and outside of 
school. This neglect or ignorance may be due to the fact that virtuous actions are 
easier to observe than virtue itself, because invisible virtue is generally demonstrated 
through humans’ behaviors. This neglect or ignorance implies that the Chinese 
government tends to believe that habituation makes people accustomed to virtues and 
finally possess virtues. However, the Chinese government has never justified this 
argument that habituation of virtuous actions results in virtuous persons. In contrast, 
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voluntariness is an important concept in many ethicists’ theories, such as Aristotle. 
Aristotle advocates habituation or character training seemingly similar to the Chinese 
government, but he also emphasizes the importance of voluntariness in a virtuous 
action. Without a sufficient exploration on happiness, how would we Chinese 
educators know that we are doing the right thing? In this sense, it is necessary for us 
Chinese educators to delve into the fundamental questions of happiness, in order to 
improve our teaching practice.  
    As a scholar from Mainland China, I am fortunate to have the opportunity to go 
beyond, at least to some degree, the constraint of a Marxist framework to explore the 
philosophical foundation of happiness. In this dissertation, I focus on three basic 
topics regarding happiness, based on my observation and personal experience of the 
teaching of happiness, and research review on this issue in Mainland China.  
a) What is happiness? 
b) What is the significance of voluntariness in virtues, which may lead to 
happiness? 
c) What is the relation between happiness and the achievement/sacrifice of 
self-interest? 
    The first question is the most basic question about happiness. It may be difficult 
to provide a universally acceptable definition of happiness; different philosophers 
disagree with each other in their definition of happiness. However, by comparing and 
analyzing different definitions of happiness, we may gain some legitimate 
understanding of the nature of happiness. This nature, though that still could be 
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abstract, and difficult to be elucidated to students, will help us establish a 
philosophical basis for the teaching of happiness in Mainland China. Different 
definitions or identification of happiness, besides the Marxist view, Aristotle’s in 
particular, would contribute to a full understanding of happiness in Mainland China. 
Without such an understanding of happiness, how could we Chinese educators say we 
know about happiness? If we do not understand it as we assume, based on what 
philosophical foundation should we teach happiness to students?  
    In addition, to let the student know what is happiness is not the only goal of the 
teaching of happiness. As suggested by the Chinese government, the ultimate purpose 
of the teaching of happiness is to help students achieve happiness in their lives. In this 
sense, we should also find out ways to achieve happiness, when we explore “What is 
happiness?” For instance, according to the Chinese government, devoting oneself to 
collectivism always leads to happiness. We need to think it over, “It that true?” and 
“why or why not? We also need to figure out, “What contributes to happiness?” The 
investigation in “What contributes to happiness” would justify or oppose some of our 
Chinese teaching practice. 
    The second and third questions, the voluntary virtue and achievement/sacrifice of 
self-interest, are both questions connected to happiness. The “correct” or tacitly 
understood answers to them imposed by the Chinese government may not be the best 
or even good answers. For instance, can we really cultivate generosity, benevolence, 
and fraternal love in students through forced, involuntary donation, as the government 
expects? Is the concern of self-interest always be bad, as it has been taught in 
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Mainland China? Why and why not? Is it possible that sometimes the concern of 
self-interest contributes to the realization of common interest rather than being 
detrimental to it? Fixed answers to these questions provided or suggested by the 
Chinese government may hinder educational practice there.   
    In summary, this dissertation centers on the philosophical foundation of the 
teaching of happiness in Mainland China. By analyzing both Marx’s and Aristotle’s 
views on the three issues of happiness, this dissertation provides different perspectives 
other than the Marxist one to view the teaching of happiness in Mainland China. The 
ultimate purpose of this dissertation is to improve the teaching practice of happiness 
in Mainland China, even to the least degree.  
2. Procedure and Methods 
    My analysis of happiness involves both Karl Marx’s and Aristotle’s works. For 
the former, the reason is obvious: the teaching of happiness in Chinese schools is 
based on Marxism. As a result, Marx’s works cannot be neglected if one decides to 
investigate moral education in Mainland China. Also, Marxism is modified and 
localized by the government; the Marxist view in Mainland China may not represent 
Marx’s own view. As a result, it necessary for me to explore Marx’s own writings on 
morality. Karl Marx seldom writes on either virtue or happiness as a particular topic, 
because he is not at all a virtue ethicist as Aristotle is. However, in his works, he still 
has left us some thoughts relevant to happiness. For instance, he writes about what the 
unhappy life of workers of his time is like and what the reason for this unhappy life is. 
In addition, Marx pays attention to both voluntary labor and self-interest, though 
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through the lens of economics or sociology rather than ethics directly.  
    In this dissertation, I concentrate on the following works of Marx, although his 
thoughts about happiness are not limited to them: Manifesto (1848), Economic and 
Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 (1844), The German Ideology (1845-1846), The 
Holy Family (1845), Capital: A Critique of Political Economy (1906), and Critique of 
Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (1843). One thing that needs to be clarified is that 
although the dominant ideology in China is mainly based on Marx, not all of his 
arguments are taken by the Chinese government. For instance, Marx’s rejection of 
morality is not taken into the Marxist view of morality in Mainland China1. Also, the 
Chinese government may demonstrate a misunderstanding of some of Marx’s own 
view.  
I select Aristotle’s works, because he is one the most influential philosophers of 
virtue ethics. His discussion about happiness, which was written almost 2400 years 
ago, still nourishes many contemporary philosophers’ thinking. Moreover, the 
“correct” principle that happiness derives from morality, which is taught in Mainland 
China, is consistent to some extent with Aristotle’s argument that happiness is the 
outcome of acting in accordance with virtue. Besides, Chinese schools apply 
habituation as a means of virtue training, which is also suggested by Aristotle as a 
necessary way to cultivate moral virtue. In addition, regarding the three questions of 
happiness that are the focus of this dissertation, Aristotle demonstrates views different 
from Marx. Aristotle’s views may inspire us Chinese educators to go beyond the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
1	   In	  the	  Chinese	  context,	  the	  Communist	  Virtues	  are	  presupposed	  to	  be	  based	  on	  Marxism;	  however,	  Marx	  
himself	  rejects	  all	  morality	  and	  virtue	  in	  his	  work.	  Additionally,	  Marx	  never	  proposes	  the	  concept	  of	  communist	  
virtues.	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Marxist framework and to conceive happiness from different perspectives. I select 
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and Politics as the main sources of his view on 
happiness. The former is Aristotle’s most influential book on ethics, also on happiness 
in particular; the latter, though it is not a treatise on ethics directly, provides many 
important arguments regarding happiness. This book centers on how to properly 
constitute a state so that the people can have happy lives.  
My dissertation is composed of six chapters.  
Chapter 1 is the background information and literature review of the teaching of 
happiness in Mainland China. A brief history of moral education in Mainland China is 
provided; it helps readers have a broad sense of how the Chinese government shapes 
students’ morality through moral education. Also, Chapter 1 focuses on what the 
“correct” Marxist view of happiness is in Mainland China, and how it is taught there. 
Examples of the teaching of happiness are provided. Based on the outline of how 
happiness is being taught in Mainland China, the literature review on this topic is also 
provided in Chapter 1. 
Chapter 2 explores Aristotle’ view of happiness. The previously stated three core 
questions are discussed. Aristotle’s arguments on happiness, cultivation of voluntary 
virtue, and self-interest are analyzed. Following the same line of core questions, 
Chapter 3 focuses on Marx’s views on these issues. Agreement and disagreement 
between both Aristotle’s and Marx’s views on happiness are compared and analyzed 
in Chapter 4. Based on the comparison between the two philosophers’ views, my own 
arguments on these three issues are also provided in this chapter. 
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Chapter 5 centers on the implications for the teaching of happiness in Mainland 
China based on the analysis in Chapter 4. It suggests other ways other than the 
dominant Marxist one to conceive and even to improve the teaching of happiness in 
Mainland China. Chapter 6 is the conclusion. It provides a summary of my entire 
dissertation; also, it suggests some further potential research questions. 
    The last thing that I would like to articulate in this introduction is my personal 
stance in this dissertation. As a scholar, I believe that there is a connection between 
happiness and morality. Also, I believe if schools teach morality or virtue, regardless 
of how they deal with it, either through hidden curriculum or through an independent 
subject matter as Chinese schools do, or any other ways, the teaching of morality 
should contribute to human well-being. However, moral education in Mainland China, 
to a great extent, fails to achieve this goal. That is, the way that happiness has been 
taught in Mainland China - basically through rote memorizing and rigid habituating - 
fails to build in students a broad understanding of happiness. Also, it fails to cultivate 
voluntary virtues in students, and these virtues, according to the government, should 
lead to students’ happiness.  
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CHAPTER 1: BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
    In this dissertation, discussions on moral education involve schools and 
institutions only in Mainland China. Taiwan, although according to the Chinese 
government is a province of China, is an independent country. Moral education in 
Taiwan has some similarities as that in Mainland China, for instance the influence of 
Confucian tradition. However, Taiwan has a different educational system, and 
Marxism has never been the dominant philosophical foundation there. Hong Kong 
and Macao, as “Special Administrative Regions” of China, both have moral education 
distinct from Mainland China due to their long colonial history and different 
educational systems. 
1. An Overview of Moral Education in Mainland China 
    a) The Confucian tradition of moral education in the ancient China 
Moral education, as a particular form of education, has a long history in 
Mainland China. In general, Confucianism was the most influential philosophy in 
China from 134 B. C. to 1895. During this period of time, moral education was based 
on Confucianism, which emphasizes character training and virtue cultivation. For 
Confucius, the ultimate purpose of education is to establish a perfect state organized 
by “rules of proprieties (li, in Confucius’ words).” As a result, Confucius suggests that 
everyone should learn all the “rules of properties,” such as benevolence, filial piety, 
righteousness, and so on, in order to establish such a state. For Confucius, everyone 
should learn moral principles to become ideal persons, or “junzi” in his words. An 
ideal person, according to Confucius, is the one who lives in a way “to illustrate 
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illustrious virtue, to renovate the people, and to rest in the highest excellence” (The 
Great Leaning, 1). Also, Confucius believes that ideal persons or “jun zi” contribute 
to the constitution of a perfect state.  
    In order to become an ideal person, Confucius suggests that one should start 
from cultivating oneself with knowledge and virtues. According to Confucius, the 
most important virtues are Ren and Li. Ren generally refers to benevolence, which is 
seen by many Confucian commentators as the “fundamental virtue of all other virtues” 
in Confucian ethics (Liu, 2004, p. 114). Li refers to a series of moral principles based 
on Ren; for Confucius, Li are established by the sage and should be followed by 
average people to achieve Ren. Confucians identify some other particular virtues as 
variables of both Ren and Li, such as loving the people, filial piety, and respectfulness 
(Confucian virtues are not limited to this list). For Confucius, once a person possesses 
these virtues, he/she should regulate him/her behavior with them. Then he/she should 
move on to apply these virtues to regulate his/her family, and then to govern the state, 
and finally to achieve the perfect state, which is “tranquil and happy” (Li Ji, li yun). 
Although Confucianism is no longer the dominant ideology in Mainland China, many 
Confucian virtues have been integrated into current moral education to inculcate good 
citizenship and characters in students. 
    b) Moral education based on Marxism in Mainland China 
    In the early 1900s, Marxism was introduced to China. When the Communist 
Party of China began to gain the power in the early 1920s, communism gradually 
replaced Confucianism and became the dominant ideology in Mainland China. This 
	  
	  
	  
12	  
replacement is also demonstrated through changes in moral education. With decades 
of curriculum re-design, moral education in Mainland China becomes an independent 
subject matter, which is based on Marxism. According to the Chinese government, 
moral education, together with intellectual, physical, artistic, and labor (working) skill 
education (Five Education, or wu yu in Chinese), may produce qualified and virtuous 
socialist citizens, and in turn, will lead to a harmonious and prosperous 
socialist/communist nation. Moral education, according to the government, is the 
most important among these five areas of education.  
    The main goal of moral education in Mainland China is to shape students’ 
socialist/communist morality and to prepare them to be qualified “socialist/communist 
Successors. According to the government, socialist/communist successors should 
possess the Four Must-Have Qualities: communist ideals, communist morality, 
knowledge, and discipline. Regarding the content of moral education, the Chinese 
government determines what is taught through morality courses and how. For instance, 
the government censors morality textbooks to make sure only the “correct” morality 
(socialist/communist morality) is taught to students. In general, the “correct” 
socialist/communist morality is claimed by the government to be based on Marxism, 
but this Marxist view of morality may not be the authentic view of Marx. That is, the 
Chinese government, more or less, distorts and localizes Marx’s own view on 
morality and society.  
    In addition, the government applies several means to arouse students’ serious 
attention to morality. For instance, students’ memory and understanding of the 
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“correct” morality is tested, and their moral performance is assessed and kept on 
records by teachers. Records of students’ morality significantly affect their future 
academic and professional development. Morality records have an important, if not 
determinant, impact on the students’ future graduation, admission especially in 
secondary and higher education levels, and their later employment in some sensitive 
administrations or departments. Usually in order to have a good moral record, Chinese 
students have to demonstrate a good memory of the “correct” morality in tests and to 
perform virtuous actions in schools. In this way, students’ voluntariness in virtuous 
actions is neglected or even ignored; I will return to voluntary virtue in Chapter 4 and 
Chapter 5. 
2. An Outline of the Teaching of Happiness in Mainland China 
    According to the Chinese government, happiness is a certain kind of life that 
only exists in a socialist/communist society. The Chinese government does not 
provide a direct definition on happiness in morality textbooks, but based on all the 
descriptions and analysis of the life in a communist society, the government tends to 
convince students that everyone will have a happy life only in a communist society. 
The Chinese government identifies current Chinese society as a socialist one, which is 
a primary and temporary stage towards a communist society. According to the 
government, since a socialist society is only at the primary stage of communism, not 
all the people are having happy lives. However, a socialist society is still superior to 
and better than any other societies, in terms of contributing to people’s happiness. 
    Students in Mainland China are expected by the government to have a “correct” 
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(or the Marxist) view of happiness, which is tightly related to communism. As a result, 
one of the most important and necessary contents to teach happiness is to teach 
Marx’s ideas of communism to students across all educational levels. Students are 
expected by the government to develop a “correct” view that happiness is inseparably 
bound to communism. Also, students are expected to memorize and understand the 
features or necessities of real happiness in a communist society, which includes 
all-sided development, to distribute products according to people’s needs, and to 
abolish private property. 
    In addition, students are taught that happiness can only be achieved by exercising 
communist virtues2. For example, a chapter titled “To Be a ‘Happy Bird’” (in the 
second grade morality textbook) focuses on the question “how to be a happy person?” 
The text indicates that by helping others and devoting oneself to collectivism, one will 
be happy. The chapter “We Are Happy: The Happiness of Sharing” (in the third grade 
textbook) focus on the idea that by sharing one’s personal possession with others, one 
makes others happy and in turn that person will be happy. Usually the 
socialist/communist virtues are collectivism-oriented virtues, which emphasize the 
absolute priority of collectivism over individuals. Universal virtues such as honesty 
and kindness are also included in socialist/communist virtues, and these universal 
virtues are usually taught in a collectivism-oriented context. The highest virtue that 
leads to happiness, according to the Chinese government, is to dedicate oneself to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
2	   According	  to	  the	  official	  document,	  communist	  virtues	  refers	  to	  virtues	  mainly	  based	  on	  Five	  Loves,	  which	  
includes	  a	  love	  for	  the	  country,	  the	  people,	  labor,	  science,	  socialists/communist	  (In	  Mainland	  China,	  a	  socialist	  is	  
purposed	  as	  the	  primary	  stage	  of	  a	  communist	  society,	  as	  a	  result,	  socialist	  and	  communist	  are	  essentially	  
synonyms	  in	  the	  Chinese	  context).	  For	  instance,	  one’s	  loyalty	  to	  the	  country	  and	  the	  Communist	  party	  is	  an	  
important	  and	  necessary	  virtue	  for	  every	  citizen	  in	  Mainland	  China.	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communism.  
    In Mainland China, different educational levels have different emphases in moral 
education. So it is in the teaching of happiness. In general, primary level moral 
education focuses on good habit training rather than learning theory; at secondary and 
higher educational levels, more Marxist theories are taught to students. Across all 
educational levels, students’ political “correctness” in their views of happiness, that is, 
their beliefs in communism as the premise of happiness, is shaped and emphasized. 
Besides morality courses, this “correctness” is also stressed through 
collectivism-oriented activities in schools. Students' active involvement in these 
activities is an important part of their morality performance to be recorded by 
teachers. For instance, students are compelled to apply to join the Young Pioneers in 
junior high and apply to join the Communist Party in high school. Those whose 
applications get approved are praised and honored, while the last-approved or even 
denied students are usually labeled “trouble-maker students.”   
    Besides communist virtue, the teaching of happiness in Mainland China also 
integrates some Confucian virtue. For instance, harmony, as a Confucian virtue, is 
integrated as an important component of happiness, although Marx himself hardly 
demonstrates enthusiasm for this particular virtue. That is to say, in the Chinese 
context, happiness implies harmony in a broad sense, such as harmony between 
individuals and collectivism, individuals and individuals, and harmony between the 
nature and human beings. Among all these relations, harmony between individuals 
and collectivism is the most important one, according to the Chinese government. 
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Students are taught that the primary principle to deal with the relation between 
individuals and collectivism is to always give the priority to the collectivism and 
always be ready to sacrifice interest in self for the interest of collectivism (common 
interest). In this sense, sacrifice of self-interest is conceived as socialist/communist 
virtue. In contrast, concern for self-interest is generally viewed as a synonym of 
egoism or selfishness in the Chinese context, which is extremely detrimental to 
communism, according to the government. As a result, students are taught that they 
should oppress their concern for self-interest and only concern for common interest. 
In this way, everyone can dedicate oneself to collectivism, and so to communism; 
finally all the people will achieve happiness. 
    In summary, in Mainland China, moral education refers to a particular subject 
matter, which deals with students’ socialist/communist morality development. 
Happiness becomes an important content of moral education in Mainland China in 
recent decades. The teaching of happiness in Mainland China can be summarized as 
the following points: 
    a) Happiness is a certain kind of life that only can be achieved in a 
socialist/communist society. 
    b) In order to achieve happiness, one should follow the socialist/communist 
virtues, which emphasize one’s dedication to the collectivism and communism. 
    c) The teaching of happiness is also based on the assessment of students’ 
memory of socialist/communist morality and virtuous performance in school. As a 
result, students’ voluntariness in these virtuous actions is neglected or ignored. 
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    d) Self-interest is generally conceived as something opposite to communism and 
real happiness; consequently, for the sake of harmony students should oppress their 
concern for self-interest and only concern for common interest. 
3. Literature Review on the Teaching of Happiness in Mainland China 
    a) Research on the Teaching of Happiness Published in Mainland China 
In the recent decades, the amount of research on the teaching of happiness in 
Mainland China has increased, as a result of the government’s propaganda of its 
political goal “to constitute a harmony and happy society.” For researches that are 
published in Mainland China, they are generally under the ideological constraint of 
the government. As a result, these researches are conducted within the Marxist 
framework. In general, the philosophical basis for these research studies are that the 
Marxist view of happiness is the only “correct” view that should be taught to students 
and should contribute students’ happy lives. 
 For instance, Meng (2010) argues that the teaching of happiness (“happiness 
education” in his words) should focus on emancipation of human beings, free labor, 
and humans’ all-round development. Meng’s argument on these three aspects of 
happiness education is based on Marxist arguments on human emancipation, labor, 
and humans’ full development in a communist society. Hou (2008) compares different 
ideas on “happiness education,” and she proposes that real happiness is always related 
to “constraint, regulation, sacrifice, and devotion,” which are typical 
socialist/communist virtues contributing to happiness imposed on students by the 
Chinese government. Zhu and Cao (2007) argue that students should develop a 
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scientific sense of happiness. This scientific sense of happiness refers to a view of 
happiness, based on both Marxism and Marxist ideas developed by the Chinese 
Leaders such as Deng, Jiang, and Hu. He (2006) proposes that the real happiness is to 
be rational and to have a valuable life. When describing what a valuable life is, He 
(2006) defines it is a life in which one constantly “develops one’s ego and to uplift the 
value of being a human.” This conception of a valuable life, according to He, is based 
on the Marxist concept of self-realization. Wang, Shen, and He (2004) and Xu (2004) 
focus on how to effectively foster communist morality in students and how to teach 
them the “correct” political beliefs or values that will contribute to their future lives. 
Although the Chinese government favors research studies within the framework 
of Marxism, Chinese researchers have also include other philosophical views in their 
writing. However, the purpose of the inclusion of different views besides Marxism is 
to compare, to criticize, and to integrate reasonable content of other views to enrich 
the Marxist view. For instance, two nationally influential textbooks on moral 
education, Chen’s (2006) On Chinese Moral Education and Huang’s (2008) The 
Reform of Chinese Moral Education in the Process of Values Transition, both 
introduce philosophies other than Marxism but treat them as potential theories to 
perfect Marxism. Hou (2008) quotes Aristotle’s idea that happiness should be 
associated with virtue, but in Hou’s argument, virtue refers to socialist/communist 
virtue in particular, which is different from Aristotle. Weiyong (2008) criticizes 
post-modern views of happiness, which according to her emphasize instant pleasures. 
Weiyong suggest that moral education in Mainland China should focus on the 
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“correct” view of happiness to encounter the challenges from “incorrect” views. 
To summarize, the researches on happiness published in Mainland China are 
largely under the ideological control of the government. Few researches go beyond 
the Marxist view of happiness, which is taught as the only “correct” view of 
happiness in Mainland China. Rather than challenging the only “correct” view, many 
researches focus on how to teach it well in schools. Research on voluntary virtue and 
self-interest published in Mainland China are rarely found. The two topics may be 
sensitive in the Chinese context. For instance, by stressing voluntary virtue, one may 
imply that moral education in Mainland China fails to cultivate voluntary virtue. This 
implication is a direct challenge of the authority and correctness of moral education in 
Mainland China. Also, in the Chinese collectivism-oriented context, attempting to 
justify self-interest is dangerous, which may be labeled individualism and incorrect. 
As a result, research on the teaching of self-interest is also lacking in Mainland China.  
    b) Research on the Teaching of Happiness or Morality that Are Not under 
the Government’s Constraint  
Sometimes Chinese researchers have opportunities to publish their studies in 
foreign journals that are out of the ideological control of the government. However, 
these researchers still try to avoid directly challenging the “correctness” of the 
Marxist view of happiness or morality in Mainland China. Also, they avoid directly 
criticizing the ideological indoctrination through moral education. A good example is 
Lian’s (1980) “Moral Education in New China,” which is written in English and 
published in International Review of Education. In this article, the author applied a 
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descriptive method in explaining what and how Communist morality is taught in 
Chinese schools. Lian (1980) attempts to hold a neutral stance towards the 
Communist-value-indoctrination programs, even if he said he was not supportive to 
them, this was apparent in his wording. A possible reason for this avoidance of direct 
criticism is that the Chinese researchers may possess positions in institutions of 
Mainland China, and their publications are still under that constraint of “political 
correctness” of the government. They do not want to challenge the authoritative 
ideology to endanger their positions. 
On the other hand, for those research studies published outside of Mainland 
China, they are usually carried out by independent researchers who are not concerned 
for Chinese government’s censorship. These research studies can cross the ideology 
barrier and directly criticize moral education in Mainland China. For instance, Bass 
(2005) criticizes that moral education in Tibet China has attempted to gradually twist 
native students’ ethnic identities, which is detrimental to students’ future happiness. 
Bass argues that moral education in Tibet not only fails to contribute to students’ 
happiness but also has negative influence on it. Cheung and Pan (2006) also offer 
works examining the outcomes of moral education in Mainland China. They argue 
that the Chinese government has failed to exclude individualism from students 
through its collectivism-oriented moral education. They find that “regulated 
individualism” and “gradual but conditional liberalization” has partly replaced 
traditional collectivism from Mao’s time, and they both have affected students’ 
morality, students’ attitude towards individualism and collectivism in particular. For 
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instance, students may have more concern for individual happiness rather than the 
happiness of the society. Hawkins, Zhou, and Lee (2001) analyze the content changes 
of moral education in Mainland China, and they argue that the Chinese government 
has struggled to balance between the collectivism and the individualism in morality 
courses. 
These research studies by outsiders contribute to a holistic understanding of 
moral education in Mainland China. Nevertheless, probably due to their perspectives 
as outsiders, they do not demonstrate a full knowledge of what and how morality, 
happiness in particular, has been and is taught in Mainland China. For example, Bass 
(2005) focuses on the Tibet area where an ethnic minority resides; education there 
could be slightly or greatly different from other areas of Mainland China. Moral 
education in Tibet may not be sufficiently representative of the general situation in 
Mainland China. Cheung and Pan’s (2006) analyses are based on governmental 
instruction menus, which may not fully indicate the reality of moral education 
practices. Similarly, Hawkins, Zhou, and Lee’s (2001) research results of moral 
education in Mainland China are based on a survey of sampling leaders in the field of 
values education. Their results manifest only the leaders’ views and may be slightly or 
greatly different to that of the general public, parents, and the students. To summarize, 
rare outside researchers fully explore the teaching of happiness in Mainland China, 
though they can go beyond the government’s constraints. 
Based on the literature review, I find that there exists little critical exploration 
regarding how happiness has been taught in Mainland China. For native Chinese 
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scholars, they have to consider the government’s tolerance for their research topics. 
Consequently, they tend not to directly challenge or criticize moral education, and 
their research studies hardly go beyond the Marxist framework. At the same time, 
researchers outside of China may freely express their critical and challenging attitude 
toward Chinese moral education. However, these scholars may be insufficiently 
familiar with the details of moral education in Mainland China, and their criticism is 
usually from disciplines like anthropology, sociology, or educational administration, 
rather than ethics. Regarding the teaching of happiness in moral education in 
Mainland China, the three core questions of this dissertation in particular, 
investigation is lacking. These questions will be addressed in this dissertation, and 
hopefully exploration of these questions will contribute to a better practice of teaching 
happiness in Mainland China. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  
	  
	  
23	  
 
CHAPTER 2: ARISTOTLE’S VIEW OF HAPPINESS 
    Aristotle’s view of happiness is one of the most influential philosophical 
thinking regarding happiness and has significantly affected many modern ethicists. 
About 2500 years ago, Aristotle addressed basic questions regarding happiness, such 
as “What is happiness?” and “How can a person achieve happiness?” His analyses of 
happiness also cover issues of voluntariness and self-interest, two important concepts 
related to happiness. 
1. Aristotle’s Conception of Happiness 
    Aristotle’s arguments on the concept of happiness can be summarized as follows: 
    a) Happiness is the highest and final good; people pursue happiness for its own 
sake.  
    b) Happiness is a certain kind of life; it means to live well and do well.  
    c) Happiness is the activity of the soul in accordance with virtue. 
    d) Happiness has embraced many different kinds of good, it involves not only 
good for individuals but also good for others. 
First of all, Aristotle’s conception of happiness is based on his argument on 
“What is good?” For Aristotle, the term “good” has as many senses as being, so “there 
could not be a common Idea set over all these goods” (NE, Book I). For instance, 
Aristotle identifies different goods in the following cases: 
… it is predicated both in the category of substance, as of God and of 
reason, and in quality, i.e. of the virtues, and in quantity, i.e. of that which 
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is moderate, and in relation, i.e. of the useful, and in time, i.e. of the right 
opportunity, and in place, i.e. of the right locality and the like. (NE, Book 
I) 
Aristotle argues that good could exist in substance, quality, quantity, relation, 
time and place. For instance, Aristotle believes that God is good; this is good in 
substance. Bravery is also a particular kind of good, which is in the category of virtue. 
A knife may useful tool a person, then, it is a particular good in relation. For Aristotle, 
there are many kinds of good; consequently, good cannot, or at least is difficult to, be 
generalized as something universal. However, Aristotle still insists that there is a 
“single Form” good that “other goods that are pursued and loved for themselves are 
called “good by reference to [it]” (NE, Book I). Aristotle believes that happiness is 
this “single Form” good, or the “chief good” or “final good” in his words.  
Aristotle states: 
Now such a thing [a particular good] happiness, above all else, is held to 
be; for this we choose always for itself and never for the sake of 
something else, but honor, pleasure, reason, and every virtue we choose 
indeed for themselves (for if nothing resulted from them we should still 
choose each of them), but we choose them also for the sake of happiness, 
judging that by means of them we shall be happy. Happiness, on the other 
hand, no one chooses for the sake of these, nor, in general, for anything 
other than itself. (NE, Book I) 
For Aristotle, happiness is good in itself and persons pursue this good for its own 
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sake. In contrast to happiness, other goods are pursued and loved by people for 
something else rather than these goods themselves. For instance, delicious food is 
good for people, but people pursue delicious food not only for the food itself but also 
for something else such as health, taste, and the pleasure of enjoying the food. 
Aristotle believes that many things like food, though they may be good for people, are 
good in the “secondary sense,” because these things tend to produce or to preserve the 
final good or to prevent something contrary to it (NE, Book I).  
    In addition, Aristotle identifies happiness as “a certain kind of life,” as “living 
well and doing well” (NE, Book I). Then, the question is, for Aristotle, what does it 
mean to live well and to do well? Aristotle believes that it means to act in accordance 
with virtue. This argument is based on Aristotle’s conception of a person’s function in 
a state. 
Aristotle states: 
… we state the function of man to be a certain kind of life, and this to be 
an activity or actions of the soul implying a rational principle, and the 
function of a good man to be the good and noble performance of these, 
and if any action is well performed when it is performed in accordance 
with the appropriate excellence: if this is the case, human good turns out to 
be activity of soul in accordance with virtue… (NE, Book I) 
    Aristotle believes that for all things that have a function or activity, the good and 
the “well” resides in the function; consequently, man’s good resides in man’s function. 
According to Aristotle, the function of man is to live well and to do well. Also, he 
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believes that in order to live well and to do well, one needs to follow rational 
principles. Since for Aristotle, following rational principles represents man’s 
excellence or virtue, which according to Aristotle is “the state of character which 
makes a man good and which makes him do his own work well” (NE, Book II). In 
this way, Aristotle states that happiness is the highest good or excellence of people, 
which is a “activity of the soul in accordance with virtue” (NE, Book I). For Aristotle, 
moral virtue can be learned and cultivated in people through habit training. He says, 
“happiness seems, [to me,] comes as a result of virtue and some process of learning or 
training” (NE, Book I). In this sense, Aristotle believes that happiness comes as a 
result of virtue habit training.  
Finally, for Aristotle, happiness is self-sufficient; it has embraced many other 
kinds of good. As a result, people cannot make happiness better by adding something 
good to it.  
Aristotle states: 
… the self-sufficient we now define as that which when isolated makes 
life desirable and lacking in nothing; and such we think happiness to be; 
and further we think it most desirable of all things, without being counted 
as one good thing among others- if it were so counted it would clearly be 
made more desirable by the addition of even the least of goods; for that 
which is added becomes an excess of goods, and of goods the greater is 
always more desirable. Happiness, then, is something final and 
self-sufficient, and is the end of action (NE, Book I). 
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 For Aristotle, in order to be happy, one needs at least some materials such as 
food, clothes, shelter, and so forth, because “no man can live well, or indeed live at all, 
unless he be provided with necessaries” (Politics, Book I, Part IV). This implies that 
for Aristotle, happiness has at least embraced some other goods such as necessary or 
possession or property. In general, these necessities enable a person to maintain his or 
her own life and to act in accordance with virtue. Otherwise, how could a starving and 
dying person act virtuously, if he or she can barely act at all? Aristotle states, “… a 
poor man cannot be magnificent, since he has not the means with which to spend 
large sums fittingly” (NE, Book IV). For Aristotle, necessary material conditions 
contribute to virtue, and in turn contribute to happiness. So, Aristotle suggests, “of the 
remaining goods, some must necessarily pre-exist as conditions of happiness, and 
others are naturally co-operative and useful as instruments” (NE, Book I).  
Besides embracing many other kinds of good, happiness, according to Aristotle, 
should embrace both an individual’s happiness and others’ happiness. He says:  
… for the final good is thought to be self-sufficient. Now by self-sufficient 
we do not mean that which is sufficient for a man by himself, for one who 
lives a solitary life, but also for parents, children, wife, and in general for 
his friends and fellow citizens… (Nicomachean Ethics, Book I). 
This quotation demonstrates that in light of Aristotle, happiness is not an issue of 
only an individual; instead, other people such as an individual’s parents, children, 
neighbors, and the entire society must be considered. For Aristotle, happiness must 
involve not only different kinds of good such as wealth or health but also the goods 
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for both others and oneself. That is to say, Aristotle conceives happiness in a 
comprehensive way; in this sense, happiness embraces all kinds of good and persons, 
and it is self-sufficient and lacking of nothing. 
2. Aristotle’s View of Voluntary Action and Involuntary Action 
    As a virtue ethicist, Aristotle insists that moral virtue can be a result of virtue 
habituation. The emphasis on habitation does not suggest that Aristotle only pay 
attention to the inculcation of virtuous action, although habit training is usually based 
on people’s overt behaviors. Aristotle notices that sometimes people may apply an 
action involuntarily, and he believes that voluntarily virtuous actions are better than 
involuntarily ones. Based on Aristotle’s argument regarding voluntary and 
involuntary, the following three points are noticeable: 
    a) For Aristotle, voluntary actions involve deliberation, while involuntary actions 
do not. 
    b) According to Aristotle, voluntary actions are moved by a “moving principle in 
a man,” while involuntary actions are moved by “moving principles in abstract.” 
    c) When considering whether an action voluntary or not, Aristotle suggests that 
one should always refer to the moment of that action. 
    Let’s unpack these arguments in detail. 
    First of all, Aristotle distinguishes voluntary actions from involuntary ones. 
Aristotle argues that a voluntary action is an action done based on an agent’s 
deliberation. According to Aristotle, “Not every class of men deliberates about the 
things that can be done by their own efforts” (NE, Book II). This idea is consistent 
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with Aristotle’s argument on different classes and their different capacities and 
functions in a state. For instance, common people and slaves either do not deliberate 
at all, or they do not deliberate as the philosophers do, because common people and 
slaves do not have sufficient wisdom. That is the reason why common people and 
slaves need the philosophers to teach them rational principles or to tell them what to 
do, according to Aristotle. In addition, Aristotle believes that this deliberation is “not 
about ends but about means” (NE, Book II). Aristotle believes that deliberation is to 
consider possible means to a certain end and to select the appropriate means. For 
instance, Aristotle argues that a doctor does not deliberate whether he shall heal, but 
through what means he can heal a patient. Through deliberation, the doctor selects a 
treatment and applies it to the patient. The selecting and application of the treatment, 
according to Aristotle, is a voluntary action. On the contrary, if due to ignorance, the 
doctor randomly selects a treatment, then in Aristotle’ view, the doctor’s action is 
involuntary, because this actions is not based on deliberation. 
    However, Aristotle’s view on whether an action is voluntary or not is very 
complicated. He provides some exceptional cases, which at first sight look 
involuntary, but are identified as voluntary by Aristotle. For instance, Aristotle 
suggests that a tyrant’s forcing someone to do something base through the threat of 
killing his family is a voluntary case. That is, for Aristotle, if the person finally does 
the base thing, he or she does it voluntarily. The action of doing the base thing seems 
to be involuntary at first sight, because this person would not do it without external 
force from the tyrant. Nevertheless, Aristotle tends to identify it as voluntary, or in his 
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words, “mixed, but [is] more like voluntary action[s]” (NE, Book II). That is, for 
Aristotle this kind of action is most likely to be voluntary, but not necessarily. His 
rationale is, to do the base thing is “worthy of choice at the time when [it] is done” 
(NE, Book II). If we recall Aristotle’s argument that deliberation is not about end but 
about means, his rationale may become easier to understand. If the end of one’s action 
is to maintain virtue or noblity, then what one should deliberate on is how to best 
achieve this end. However, in the tyrant’s case, the end is not only to maintain virtue, 
but also a more urgent end, to secure one’s family. Since the end changes, then the 
deliberation on the means should also change. To do the base thing, though it is 
blameworthy, seems to this person the only means to save his or her family at that 
moment. As a result, according to Aristotle, it is voluntary. 
    In addition, it seems to Aristotle that when a person acts involuntarily, that is, to 
act without deliberation on why he or she acts in a certain way, this person is not 
really moved by himself or herself. Instead, for Aristotle, it is like this person carried 
by a wind. Aristotle identifies this situation as being moved by “moving principles in 
the abstract” (NE, Book II). In Aristotle’s terms, “moving principles in the abstract” is 
opposite to “moving principles in a man.” The former are the moving principles 
shaped by factors outside of a man, while the latter are principles internalized in 
man’s nature. 
    Aristotle states: 
Both the terms, then, 'voluntary' and 'involuntary', must be used with 
reference to the moment of action. Now the man acts voluntarily; for the 
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principle that moves the instrumental parts of the body in such actions is 
in him, and the things of which the moving principle is in a man himself 
are in his power to do or not to do. Such actions, therefore, are voluntary, 
but in the abstract perhaps involuntary; for no one would choose any such 
act in itself (NE, Book III). 
    According to Aristotle, a person feels compulsion to do something with these 
outside principles, in which “ nothing is contributed by the person who is acting or is 
feeling the passion” (NE, Book III). For instance, when the ignorant doctor in the 
previous case randomly selects a treatment, the doctor himself or herself contribute 
nothing to this selection, compared to the case where a doctor deliberately selects that 
same treatment. This ignorant doctor is being carried by something outside of 
him/her, as a result, Aristotle believes this doctor acts involuntarily. Similarly, 
Aristotle suggests that other people who can manipulate a person also belong to 
outside principles. That is, if someone is threatened or manipulated by some powerful 
people, and this person does something according to their commands, then this 
person’s action is also involuntary.  
    However, based on Aristotle’s argument, it still may be still not so easy to 
distinguish “moving principles in a man” from “moving principles in the abstract,” 
because in practice things are very complicated and mixed. For instance, a person 
may be moved by mixed moving principles to act in a certain way. Then the question 
is, how to distinguish one principle from another? Or, can we really identify purely 
internal or external principles, when everyone is affected by multiple factors, 
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including both inward and outward? Since in many cases, the moving principles are a 
combination of both, Aristotle himself calls this kind of actions mixed; also he says 
that actions moved by principles in the abstract are only “perhaps” involuntary. 
    If we combine the doctor’s and the tyrant’s case together, we may find why 
Aristotle calls some cases “mixed” regarding voluntary or involuntary. Supposed a 
doctor should select a treatment to save a patient’s life, but the doctor is threatened by 
a tyrant to let the patient die, otherwise the doctor’s family would be killed. If the 
doctor finally withholds all treatments and lets the patient die, then in Aristotle’s 
view, is the doctor’s withholding of treatment voluntary or involuntary? According to 
Aristotle, voluntary actions are actions based on deliberation about the means. Based 
on this argument, the doctor’s action is voluntary, because the doctor has to deliberate 
on his situation and select a particular means. However, Aristotle also argues that 
involuntary actions are those moved by “moving principles in the abstract” rather than 
“moving principles in a man.” When we refer to this argument, the doctor’s action is 
actually moved by an outside principle, which is a person in the power who can 
manipulate the doctor. In this sense, the doctor’s actions should be identified as 
involuntary.  
    According to Aristotle, it is difficult to identify voluntary and involuntary 
actions, due to the complexity of humans’ nature and their lives. But one thing in 
Aristotle’s arguments that we should keep in mind is that we should always refer to 
“the moment of action” to judge whether an action is voluntary or involuntary. In the 
doctor’s case, we may say that the doctor voluntarily saves his family by involuntarily 
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letting the patient die. When referring to different ends and different means, we may 
come to different conclusions about what is voluntary and what is not. 
3. Aristotle’s View on Self-interest 
    Aristotle’s conception of self-interest is related to Aristotle’s argument on how to 
manage a state. That is, Aristotle tends to believe that a good state is managed on a 
private basis rather than a common one. That is, if everyone is properly concerned for 
the interest in self and appropriately pursues self-interest, then personal lives and the 
state are both good. Aristotle’s discussion on self-interest contains the following 
points: 
    a) To act in one’s interest resides in humans’ nature; if not taken to an extreme, 
self-interest is positive to people’s development. 
    b) Private property based on self-interest should be kept; while a society 
managed on a common basis may be chaotic. 
    c) Self-interest is the basis for certain virtues such as generosity. 
    d) Selflessness in noble, but only few people can really give up concern for 
self-interest and only look out for other’s interest. 
First of all, Aristotle distinguishes self-interest from egoism. He believes that 
unlike vicious egoism, self-interest, is necessary and positive in man’s development. 
As Aristotle states, “… when everyone has a distinct interest, men will not complain 
of one another, and they will make more progress, because everyone will be attending 
to his own business” (Politics, Book II, Part V). For instance, when a person is 
concerned for his or her health, which is generally in his or her own interest, this 
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concern for self-interest may compel this person to improve his or her physical 
condition. Consequently, this person may have only healthy food and do physical 
exercises. With a better physical condition, this person may be more energetic to 
participate in activities such as helping others. In this sense, self-interest could be very 
positive and contributive to people’s development, both individuals and others. 
However, excessive or exclusive concern for self-interest is close to egoism, 
which Aristotle criticizes: 
Again, how immeasurably greater is the pleasure, when a man feels a 
thing to be his own; for surely the love of self is a feeling implanted by 
nature and not given in vain, although selfishness is rightly censured; this, 
however, is not the mere love of self, but the love of self in excess 
(Politics, Book II, Part V). 
For Aristotle, the feeling of having something of one’s own is pleasant. It is 
determined by persons’ nature that they act for their own sake or to love themselves. 
This love of self is the basis of one’s concern for interest in self. According to 
Aristotle, when this love of self is excessive, one may become selfish. Selfishness or 
egoism is beyond Aristotle’s definition of positive self-interest; the latter should be 
encouraged but the former should be blamed.  
Aristotle’s distinction between self-interest and selfishness is based on several 
considerations. First of all, according to Aristotle, a defect or excess in certain 
character are two vices for people. In this sense, since selfishness or egoism is the 
excess of self-love, it should be “rightly censured” (Politics, Book II, Part V). In 
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addition, for Aristotle, the proper self-love is not to gratify one’s own interest only. 
Instead, proper self-love should also take into consideration others’ interests. As 
Aristotle says, “… the good man acts for honor's sake, and the more so the better he is, 
and acts for his friend's sake, and sacrifices his own interest” (NE, Book IX). That is, 
Aristotle believes that a good person should first be a self-lover, but more important, a 
good person acts for others’ sake as well. For example, if a person stays away from 
danger, this person may be called a self-lover. But if this person, who is aware of the 
danger to save a drowning stranger in a deep river but still exercises the noble action, 
then this person is noble. He or she is noble because he or she sacrifices self-interest 
for the stranger’s sake and/or honor’s sake rather than for anything else such as 
rewards. In this sense, Aristotle suggests that to be concerned for and to act in 
self-interest is natural, but to sacrifice self-interest in proper ways at proper times and 
to act in others’ interests may make one noble. This point is central to Aristotle’s view 
on self-interest. 
Secondly, Aristotle tends to emphasize the conflict between self-interest and 
common interest. His argument is based on his justification of private property, which 
is generally based on self-interest. Aristotle argues that people must keep property 
private, so that their rights, benefits, and responsibilities may be clear. He says, 
“Property should be in a certain sense common, but, as a general rule, private” 
(Politics, Book II, Part V). Aristotle’s rationale is that when everyone has a distinct 
self-interest, he or she will focus on his or her own business and try to make progress 
in oneself. Also, according to Aristotle, when one is focusing on one’s own business, 
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people would not complain about each another. In contrast, Aristotle sees several 
disadvantages of a state based on a common basis, where people frequently complain 
about each other. Aristotle claims that “there is much more quarrelling among those 
who have all things in common” than those who have private property (Politics, Book 
II, Part V). One of the reasons for the quarrelling is, Aristotle suggests that it is 
difficult to identify one’s particular responsibility or rights, since everyone shares 
everything. For instance, should a wife clean all other peoples’ house, since it is also 
this wife’s houses on the common basis? If this wife refuses to clean others’ houses, 
should other wives still clean her house? It seems to Aristotle, a common basis may 
cause this kind of confusion and make a state or family chaotic.  
Thirdly, Aristotle insists that some virtue such as liberality is based on private 
property. For instance, according to Aristotle, when a person has private property, he 
or she can do liberal actions to help his friends, guests, or even strangers. This liberal 
action involves the sacrifice of self-interest. In this sense, for Aristotle, virtues such as 
liberality and generosity are based on self-interest. Without self-interest, these virtues 
seem to lose their ethical basis. Also, according to Aristotle, evils such as selfishness 
do not arise out of the possession of private property, but from “the weakness of 
human nature” (Politics, Book II, Part V). That is to say, Aristotle does not believe 
private property causes egoism; neither does he believe that the best way to eliminate 
egoism is to abolish private property.  
Finally, Aristotle believes that only very few people can look out for others’ 
interest without being concerned for their own interest. Aristotle calls this kind of 
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person the self-sufficient man, who is “sufficient to himself and excels his subjects in 
all good things” (NE, Book VIII). According to Aristotle, a self-sufficient person 
“needs nothing further” and “will not look to his own interests but to those of his 
subjects”. Aristotle argues that only the king of a state, rather than everyone, can be 
self-sufficient and always looks to the advantages of his subjects.  
To summarize, Aristotle believes self-interest can be positive to people’s progress. 
However, excessive concern for self-interest leads to selfishness. Aristotle justifies 
people’s concern and pursuits for self-interest, but criticizes selfishness. Also, 
Aristotle tends to doubt the complete consistency between self-interest and common 
interest. Rather, Aristotle believes that they generally conflict with each other. He 
advocates private property and implies that it is a good way to protect self-interest. 
Moreover, Aristotle believes that self-interest could be the basis of some particular 
virtues such as liberality. Finally, he believes that only few people rather than all can 
be really selfless and concerned for only interest of others. 
4. Conclusion  
Aristotle provides tremendous inspiring thoughts on happiness. First of all, 
Aristotle believes that happiness is the highest good of human beings; it is an activity 
of the soul in accordance with virtue. Secondly, Aristotle believes that voluntary 
virtue contribute more to happiness rather than involuntary virtue. And he suggests 
that voluntary virtue can be cultivated in people through habituation. Finally, Aristotle 
states that concern of self-interest is positive in a person’s development; he also 
insists that private property based on self-interest should be kept in order to constitute 
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a good state. 
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CHAPTER 3: MARX’S VIEW OF HAPPINESS 
    Marx is not at all a virtue ethicist; he seldom writes directly on happiness. For 
Marx, happiness is not the most important thing to be considered for human beings. 
There are some other dimensions in Marx’s writings, such as self-realization of 
human essence, freedom, communism, which are at least equivalently important as 
happiness, if not more important. Marx describes the unhappy or pathetic lives of 
workers of his time; also he predicts a perfect life in a communist society. This 
indirect writing on happiness is the main source for us to explore Marx’s view on 
relevant issues of happiness. Also, Marx explores voluntary labor and self-interest in 
his works, which is a valuable source for us to understand his view on both 
voluntariness and self-interest.  
1. Marx’s Conception of Happiness 
    Marx’s conception of happiness can be summarized as follows: 
    a) Happiness is a particular good but no higher than some other goods, such as 
freedom and self-realization of human essence. 
    b) Private property and alienation cause unhappy lives, as a result, happiness can 
only be achieved based on the abolishment of private property and alienation. 
    c) Happiness should also be based on sufficient materials or social products. 
    d) Happiness should include happiness of both individuals and others. 
First of all, Marx tends to identify happiness as one of the highest goods for 
human beings but not the only one. For instance, Marx criticizes that the aim of 
industry in his time is “the possession of wealth”; and he argues that the aim of 
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industry should be “happiness of men” (Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 
1844, p.10, EPM for short for the following discussion). In this sense, Marx believes 
that happiness is not only important but also necessary for human beings. However, 
For Marx, happiness, as important as it is, is not the highest or ultimate goal of human 
beings. He never indicates that happiness is the only highest good of human society. 
Marx’s conception of happiness is based on his prediction of a happy or even perfect 
life in a communist society. Marx seldom identifies the life in a communist society as 
a happy life, though he would not deny that life there is happy. Marx tends to 
conceive communism as the precondition of real happiness for the entire human 
species. Marx states that communism is “the doctrine of the conditions of the 
liberation of the proletariat” (Manifesto, p. 44). It seems to Marx that communism 
leads to happiness rather than vice versa. In this sense, Marx tends to suggest that 
happiness is not the highest good of human beings, at least not the only one.  
Besides happiness, Marx also stresses some other equivalently important goods 
for human beings, such as the realization of human essence. Marx puts great emphasis 
on it, and he uses several different expressions, such as “full development of all our 
potentialities” and “rounded development of all members” to illustrate the realization 
of human essence in a communist society. Expressions regarding men’s 
self-realization or full development appear more frequently than happiness in Marx’s 
writings. In addition, Marx also stresses freedom of the human species. When Marx 
strongly criticizes the enslavement of workers, he tends to conceive freedom as a 
standard to evaluate whether people are really “Men” and whether they can fully 
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develop their capacities. For Marx, humans’ full development must represent by 
freedom. He says, “…free, conscious activity is man’s species-character” (EPM, p. 
31). When humans are no longer subject to the division of labor, they make their lives 
free, and “the genuine and free development of individuals” can be achieved (The 
German Ideology, p. 51). In brief, if Marx believes that there is a hierarchy of goods, 
he tends to position happiness as a particular good among the highest goods, but not 
the only one. 
Second, Marx’s conception of happiness is based on his consideration of private 
property and alienation. Regarding “what is happiness”, Marx does not give a direct 
answer in his writings. However, his description of an unhappy life of workers in his 
time may give us some clues on Marx’s view on “What contributes to happiness?” 
For Marx, the workers of his time, regardless in which country they live, were 
suffering from unhappy or even tragic lives. The unhappy lives, according to Marx, 
derive from private property. For Marx, private property causes alienation, which 
refers to the separation between humans’ labor from their products. That is, humans, 
the proletariat in particular, cannot enjoy what they have created or produced by their 
labor, which for Marx, is abnormal. Since people cannot enjoy what they have created, 
they are unhappy. Marx believes that this alienation deriving from private property is 
both the cause and demonstration of an unhappy life.  
For Marx, self-realization is the opposite of alienation. For Marx, men, unlike 
other animal species, are creators of not only the world but also themselves, because 
men can produce “their means of subsistence” (The German Ideology, p.6). 
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Consequently, men are “indirectly producing their actual material life” (The German 
Ideology, p.6). In this sense, Marx affirms that by producing and enjoying what 
human beings have created, men become men. He says, “As individuals express their 
life, so they are” (The German Ideology, p.6). Marx calls this process the “realization 
of human essence” (Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, p. 3). Marx believes an 
ideal person should have the capacities to produce, and at the same time, enjoy the 
production. In contrast, alienation represents that humans fail to express their lives or 
realize their essence as human beings.  
For Marx, since workers cannot afford and enjoy what they have produced, that 
is, they are alienated from what they have created, it is impossible for them to have 
happy lives. Marx thinks that these workers are “working animal[s]” and they are like 
“beast[s] reduced to the strictest bodily needs” (EPM, p.7). Marx associates both 
alienation and workers’ unhappy lives to private property; he believes that private 
property is “the necessary consequence of alienated labor,” and the accumulation of 
private property exacerbates the alienation and workers’ unhappiness (EPM, p.33). 
According to Marx, workers provide labor, but they do not possess any productive 
material or means, while capitalists have the productive property. Workers have to 
sell their labor for a low wage, and capitalists purchase workers’ labor to produce. 
Workers and capitalists are not equal to each other with regard to productive power 
and production distribution. The latter always tend to maximize surplus value of the 
products; workers are paid only a small amount of money to maintain their basic 
living. For Marx, the conflict between workers and capitalists, labor and capital, 
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actually represents the “antithesis between lack of property and property” (EPM, p. 
42). That is, the conflict between worker and capitalists derives from different 
possession of private property. As a result, Marx believes that in order to have a 
happy life, people must first abolish private property and alienation based on it. 
Third, for Marx, happiness involves social products sufficient for the satisfaction 
of people’s needs. Marx sketches a possible happy life in an ideal society, a 
communist society. Marx argues that all the productions of the society must be 
managed communally, and the needs of the entire society should be satisfied 
(Manifesto, p. 47-51). Marx also argues that in a communist society, “machinery and 
other inventions made it possible to hold out the prospect of an all-sided development, 
a happy existence, for all members of society” (Manifesto, p. 39). That is to say, a 
communist society should have sufficient productions to satisfy the entire society’s 
needs, at the same time to maintain everyone’s all-sided development.  
Finally, Marx argues that happiness involves both happiness of the individual 
and happiness for all. Marx argues that a communist society should be organized on 
“certain irrefutable basic principles” (Manifesto, p. 37). According to Marx, these 
basic principles include principles such as “every individual strives to be happy” and 
“the happiness of the individual is inseparable from the happiness of all” (Manifesto, 
p. 37). Since communism abolishes both alienation and private property, then the 
entire society at large can be emancipated from all kinds of limitations derived from 
private property and alienation. In this way, people may fully develop their capacities 
and their relationships with one another. They are no longer alienated but cooperative. 
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In this way, for Marx, people in a communist society can dedicate themselves to all. 
As a result, Marx believes that in a communist society, happiness for a self is 
consistent with happiness for other. This argument is also demonstrated in Marx’s 
consideration of self-interest and common interest, which I will discuss later in 
section 3.  
2. Marx’s View on Voluntary and Involuntary 
Marx’s view about the importance of voluntariness in one’s action is based on 
his argument about labor, but not virtue. As discussed before, Marx is not directly 
interested in morality or ethics, and he believes that morality could be used by the 
ruling class as a tool of oppression. As a result, whether a virtuous action is voluntary 
or not is not a question that Marx asks. However, Marx still covers the topic of 
voluntary and involuntary action in his writing, but through the lens of labor rather 
than ethics. Marx distinguishes voluntary labor from involuntary labor, and he values 
the former as a form of humans’ self-assertion or self-realization of their humanity, or 
in his words, the realization of human essence. At the same time, Marx objects to 
involuntary labor and believes it represents humans’ self-denial. 
Marx says: 
… the fact that labor is external to the worker, i.e., it does not belong to 
his intrinsic nature; that in his work, therefore, he does not affirm himself 
but denies himself, does not feel content but unhappy, does not develop 
freely his physical and mental energy but mortifies his body and ruins his 
mind…His labor is therefore not voluntary, but coerced; it is forced labor. 
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It is therefore not the satisfaction of a need; it is merely a means to satisfy 
needs external to it. Its alien character emerges clearly in the fact that as 
soon as no physical or other compulsion exists, labor is shunned like the 
plague.  (EPM, p.30) 
For Marx, labor is a particular activity, that can only be done by humans rather 
than any other animals in this world. According to Marx, through labor, humans 
create not only the world around them but also themselves. As a result, labor as a 
creative activity, represents humans’ self-realization. In addition, Marx believes that 
humans, as both individuals and an entire species, should voluntarily and 
cooperatively produce and enjoy their labor products. This process of both producing 
and enjoying is the basis of a happy life, in the light of Marx. In this sense, Marx 
argues that in an ideal society, everyone should labor voluntarily, because labor 
contributes to his or her self-realization. In short, Marx proposes that voluntary labor 
contributes to humans’ happy lives.  
According to Marx, the workers of his time did not labor voluntarily, because the 
workers could not enjoy the products that they have created. Marx describes that these 
workers had to labor for a long time each day with low pay, but they could not afford 
the products that they created through their labor. This kind of involuntary labor, for 
Marx, does not lead to the realization of human essence. As a result, the workers of 
his time were having unhappy lives. Marx argues that capitalists, who barely labor at 
all, are happy by occupying what the workers have created. For Marx, involuntary 
labor does not represent human’s intrinsic nature; also, humans deny rather than 
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confirm themselves through this kind of work. As a result, involuntary labor is painful 
for humans, and they feel forced to work. In this sense, Marx says that involuntary 
labor leads to human’s unhappiness while voluntary labor lead to happiness. 
Since Marx distinguishes voluntary labor from involuntary labor, would he also 
distinguish voluntary virtue from involuntary virtue? It is difficult to find Marx’s 
direct answer to this question, since Marx barely focuses on virtue or morality in his 
writings. For Marx, a more meaningful question would be “Is morality/virtue 
important?” rather than “Is voluntary morality/virtue important?” According to Marx, 
morality or virtue is:  
    a) a particular mental production of human society; 
    b) can be used as a ruling tool to oppress the people; and  
    c) would disappear in a communist society.  
Regarding mental production, Marx states:  
The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first 
directly interwoven with the material activity and the material 
intercourse of men, the language of real life. Conceiving, thinking, the 
mental intercourse of men, appear at this stage as the direct efflux of 
their material behavior. The same applies to mental production as 
expressed in the language of politics, laws, morality, religion, 
metaphysics, etc. of a people. Consciousness can never be anything else 
than conscious existence, and the existence of men is their actual 
life-process (The German Ideology, p. 9). 
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For Marx, virtue or morality is a “mental production” of human beings, which is 
no higher than any other production produced by human beings. That is, Marx does 
not view virtue or morality as something superior, praiseworthy, or connecting to 
happiness. Instead, Marx argues that the process of the “particular mode of 
production,” which creates morality or virtue could be neutral. However, Marx 
believes how the outcome of the mental production is used could be very negative or 
blameworthy, for instance, it could be used as a means to rule or oppress. Marx 
believes that in a class society, the dominant class usually determines the dominant 
morality. He poses, “The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas” 
(The German Ideology, p. 2). For example, Marx argues that in a capitalist society, 
the bourgeois morality is preached to the proletariat by the capitalist as the ruling 
morality. This morality, for Marx, is a deceptive means for the capitalists to 
manipulate the proletariat and to maintain the capitalists’ rule. The capitalists may 
preach to the workers the bourgeois morality such as submission or sobriety, so that 
the workers may be satisfied with “temperate living and constant employment” and 
would not rebel against the capitalists’ rule (Capital I, p. 485). By following this 
morality, Marx suggests that the proletariat would not emancipate themselves from an 
unfair and unequal system, not to mention having real happy life. What the proletariat 
identify as happiness, such as religious happiness, according to Marx, is “illusory 
happiness.” In this sense, bourgeois morality hinders rather than contributes to the 
happiness of the proletariat. As a result, Marx argues that it does not matter whether 
being in accordance with a certain morality is voluntary or not, since anyhow it would 
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not result in happiness, freedom, or self-assertion.  
Surely, there are some cases where morality or virtue is not used as a tool of 
ruling. For instance, there are some universal moral principles such as honesty, which 
are not used as a means of oppression. In this kind of case, would Marx agree that it is 
better for one to be voluntarily honest than involuntarily? Marx tends not to answer 
this question independently; he would ask to know about the social conditions where 
the case exists. As discussed before, Marx’s discussion of voluntary or involuntary is 
from an economic or sociological perspective rather than an ethical one. He objects to 
discussing virtue or morality without considering its social conditions. 
For example, Marx says: 
The ethics of political economy is acquisition, work, thrift, sobriety – but 
political economy promises to satisfy my needs. – The political economy 
of ethics is the opulence of a good conscience, of virtue, etc.; but how can 
I live virtuously if I do not live? And how can I have a good conscience if 
I do not know anything? It stems from the very nature of estrangement 
that each sphere applies to me a different and opposite yardstick… (EPM 
of 1844, p.51-52) 
    In this quotation, Marx demonstrates several concerns regarding the meaning of 
being virtuous. First of all, Marx believes that we can never discuss virtue separately 
from its existing social conditions, which is for Marx the premise of morality or virtue. 
Marx would like to know “What are the social conditions?” and “What kind of life 
that a person is living?” For those who barely have lives, Marx doubts the meaning of 
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being virtuous for those people. Marx does not explain what he means by “do not live” 
in this quotation. Based on his analysis on the tragic life of people in his time, Marx 
suggests that a normal life that everyone should live would be a life where people can 
realize their human essence through their voluntary labor, that is, they could 
cooperatively create and enjoy their products together. If people do not have normal 
lives, or “do not live,” then Marx would argue that it is not important whether they are 
virtuous or not.  
    Second, Marx is concerned for the potential conflict among different virtues or 
moralities, because according to Marx, different classes may produce contradictory 
virtues. This consideration is based on Marx’s view on estrangement, which is a 
process that humans are estranged from not only materials that they have produced, 
but also from other human beings. When humans are estranged from one another, as 
individuals or as members of particular classes, conflict arises, not only in their 
interest but also in their mental production. In this sense, Marx argues, “each sphere 
applies to me a different and opposite yardstick.” As a result, before considering 
whether a virtuous action is voluntary or not, he would first focus on “Which class’s 
morality?” or “What kind of morality is it?”. 
In addition, Marx claims that morality, as a particular mental product of humans, 
will disappear in a communist society. He says in the Manifesto, “Communism 
abolishes eternal truths, it abolishes all religion, and all morality, instead of 
constituting them on a new basis” (p. 26). That is, for Marx, people in a communist 
society are free from all morality. If all the moral principles would never exist in a 
	  
	  
	  
50	  
communist society, according to Marx, then what is the point to discuss voluntariness 
or involuntariness in following these principles? 
    In summary, Marx views the importance of voluntariness through the lens of 
labor rather than virtue. He believes that voluntary labor represents self-realization of 
human essence, while involuntary labor represents their self-denial. Marx would 
reject Aristotle’s argument on the dependence between happiness and virtue, because 
for Marx, happiness might come together with humans’ self-realization rather than 
being according with virtue. Moreover, Marx believes that certain morality or virtue 
could be used as a ruling tool and would lead to unhappiness or “illusory happiness.” 
Marx does not believe that voluntariness in virtue is an important issue. For Marx, 
virtue or morality, as a mental product of certain social conditions, will disappear in a 
communist society. As a result, Marx doubts the necessity of virtue or morality in a 
state, regardless of whether it is voluntary or involuntary. Also, Marx would argue 
that we should not separately conceive of virtue or morality from their existing social 
conditions. He thinks that it is meaningless to discuss virtue when people are not 
having normal lives.  
3. Marx’s View on Self-interest and Common Interest 
In general, Marx does not demonstrate a negative attitude towards self-interest 
compared to his attitude towards private property. Marx’s view on self-interest can be 
summarized as follows: 
    a) Concern for interest in self, just as egoism and selflessness, is a social 
consciousness determined by social conditions, which is not blameworthy or 
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praiseworthy.  
    b) Self-constraint is not the only option to make people stay away from egoism or 
selfishness. 
    c) Self-interest and common interest mutually shaped each other rather than 
conflict each other. 
Regarding point a), Marx says: 
Communists do not oppose egoism to selflessness or selflessness to 
egoism, nor do they express this contradiction theoretically either in its 
sentimental or in its highflown ideological form; they rather demonstrate 
its material source, with which it disappears of itself. The Communists do 
not preach morality at all. They do not put to people the moral demand: 
love one another, do not be egoists, etc.; on the contrary, they are very 
well aware that egoism, just as much selflessness, is in definite 
circumstances a necessary form of the self-assertion of individuals (The 
German Ideology, p.58). 
This quotation contains a few of Marx’s important ideas regarding self-interest. 
First of all, Marx does not think egoism or selflessness is a moral issue, because of his 
rejection of morality. For Marx, egoism and selflessness can be just “necessary form[s] 
of the self-assertion of individuals.” These forms of self-assertion are determined by 
their circumstances or “material source.” Moreover, Marx believes that egoism is not 
necessarily opposite to selflessness, because they are different forms determined by 
different social conditions. That is, to oppose egoism to selflessness is like to oppose 
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an apple to a banana, which seems to Marx pointless. According to Marx, egoism is a 
phenomenon existing in certain societies, for instance a capitalist society. People in a 
capitalist society may demonstrate egoism; they may attempt to act in their own 
self-interests without considering others’ interests. This egoism, for Marx, is not 
based on human nature but on private property. In Marx’ view, if private property 
were abolished, then the egoism originating from private property would disappear. 
On the other hand, for Marx, selflessness is not a virtue that should be preached. 
People in a communist society will naturally be selfless, because private property, the 
root of egoism and the hindrance for selflessness, would be abolished. In this sense, 
Marx argues that people in a communist society are concerned most of all for 
common interest. In brief, Marx believes that both egoism and selflessness are merely 
two forms of self-assertion that are determined by certain social circumstances. As 
long as these social circumstances exist, so do the particular “form[s] of self-assertion 
of individuals.” The forms themselves, as results of certain social conditions, are 
neither blameworthy nor praiseworthy. 
In addition, Marx does not believe that self-constraint from desires is a good way 
to achieve selflessness. First of all, Marx argues that it is not necessary to always 
control one’s desires. For instance, he argues that in, and only in, a communist society, 
people do not at all need to restrain from or oppress their needs and desires, because 
they will no longer have excessive or inappropriate desires that should be bridled.  
 Marx states: 
… the Communists are the only people through whose historical activity 
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the liquefaction of the fixed desires and ideas is in fact brought about and 
ceases to be an impotent moral injunction… Communist organization has 
a twofold effect on the desires produced in the individual by present-day 
relations; some of these desires — namely desires which exist under all 
relations, and only change their form and direction under different social 
relations — are merely altered by the Communist social system, for they 
are given the opportunity to develop normally; but others — namely those 
originating solely in a particular society, under particular conditions of 
[production] and intercourse — are totally deprived of their conditions of 
existence (The German Ideology, p. 51). 
For Marx, people’s desires are produced by social conditions where people live. 
Some desires such as eating and drinking exist across different social forms. These 
kinds of desires only change their forms but will not disappear in a communist society. 
According to Marx, a communist society would have sufficient materials or products 
to satisfy these kinds of desires. Regarding excessive desires, such as obsession for 
unlimited delicious food and delicate clothes, Marx argues that they are actually 
desires developed abnormally. If these desires are “given the opportunity to develop 
normally” (in a communist society), then there would be no excessive desires at all. In 
short, people’s universal desires will be well satisfied in a communist society, so 
people eventually do not need to oppress them at all. On the other hand, for desires 
originating from particular social conditions - for instance desires for profits or 
surplus values in a capitalist society – these desires will disappear in a communist 
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society because of the abolishment of their social conditions. As a result, Marx 
believes that people in a communist society do not need to restrain from or suppress 
these particular desires at well, because they will no longer exist there due to the 
abolishment of their particular social conditions. For Marx, the only way to eliminate 
egoism is to abolish all social conditions that cause egoism. 
Moreover, Marx tends to criticize the preaching (or teaching) of self-restraint to 
the people. For Marx, as long as the material circumstances that arouse egoism exists, 
it is impotent to preach or teach the virtue of self-restraint to make people stay away 
from egoism. Marx believes that egoism itself should not take blame or critique; he 
does not value self-restraint or desire-control as a virtue. As Marx argues, to require 
people to oppress their desire is actually an “an impotent moral injunction” in a 
capitalist society (The German Ideology, p. 51). By this argument, Marx does not 
endorse greed or egoism. He does not suggest that people should let their desires run 
wild. His point is that virtue preaching or teaching, in a capitalist society in particular, 
is just a means of ruling rather than a way to improve people’s morality. Marx argues 
that the proletariat is preached at with the morality of self-restraint, the proletariat is 
expected by the capitalists to take social conditions as they are; that is, to be satisfied 
with low salary and poor living conditions and never rebel against the capitalists’ rule. 
In this sense, Marx rejects self-restraint or desire-control as virtues.  
As for the relation between self-interest and common interest, Marx does not 
believe that self-interest and common interest always conflict with each other. For 
instance, when criticizing Sahcho’s idea that “personal interest” comes into 
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contradiction with “class interest” or “common interest,” Marx says: 
Incidentally, even in the banal, petty-bourgeois German form in which 
Sancho perceives contradiction of personal and general interests, he 
should realize that individuals have always started out from themselves, 
and could not do otherwise, and that therefore the two aspects he noted are 
aspects of the personal development of individuals; both are equally 
engendered by the empirical conditions under which the individuals live, 
both are only expressions of one and the same personal development of 
people and are therefore only in seeming contradiction to each other (The 
German Ideology, p. 50). 
For Marx, it is natural for one to be concerned for self-interest, because every 
individual has an interest in food, clothing, shelter, and so forth to maintain his or her 
life. As a result, private interest, according to Marx, is the starting point of human life. 
While in a society, however, few can really isolate themselves from others and live all 
by themselves, and then common interest becomes an unavoidable concern due to the 
interdependent relationship between humans. In this sense, Marx believes that both 
self-interest and common interest are only two aspects of “the personal development 
of individuals.” They both are equally engendered by the social conditions where the 
individuals live, and they co-exist with each other. In addition, self-interest and 
common interest do not necessarily conflict with one another. If there is a 
contradiction between them, then for Marx, this contradiction is just “seeming” rather 
than real. In order to explain why this contradiction is a “seeming” one, Marx says: 
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Communist theoreticians… have discovered that throughout history the 
"general interest" is created by individuals who are defined as "private 
persons". They know that this contradiction is only a seeming one because 
one side of it, what is called the "general interest", is constantly being 
produced by the other side, private interest, and in relation to the latter is 
by no means an independent force with an independent history — so that 
this contradiction is in practice constantly destroyed and reproduced (The 
German Ideology, p. 58). 
For Marx, common interest and self-interest mutually shape each other rather 
than conflict with each other. For instance, I want the place I live to be pleasant and 
clean; this is based on my self-interest. You want your place pleasant and clean; this is 
based largely on your self-interest. Supposed we are neighbors, and since we both 
want a pleasant and clean environment, then our common interest arises. That is, we 
both want not only my place, but also your place to be pleasant and clean. Otherwise, 
a messy and dirty neighbor could destroy one’s desire for a pleasant place. In this 
sense, Marx argues that a person, in a practical sense, cannot be purely egoistical, that 
is, be exclusively concerned for the interest in self without taking others’ interests into 
consideration. Due to “the developed mode of production and intercourse and the 
division of labor,” everyone needs others (The German Ideology, p. 17). When people 
satisfy their own needs, they must in return satisfy some of others’ needs. As a result, 
in Marx’s view, people have to make self-interest in harmony with common interest if 
they want to have a good life in the long run.  
	  
	  
	  
57	  
Since, according to Marx, common interest and self-interest constantly reshape 
each other, then why do they sometimes seem to contradict each other? For Marx, it is 
because societies of his time make people compete with each other rather than 
cooperate with each other. And this competition, which according to Marx is not 
necessary for human life but rather caused by particular social conditions, engenders 
the seeming conflict between one’s interest and another’s, between self-interest and 
common interest. For instance, in a capitalist society, capitalists ignore and even 
infringe upon the proletariat’s interest in order to guarantee maximizing their profits. 
Meanwhile, the proletariat requires and struggles for higher salaries and this, from the 
perspective of capitalists, harms their self-interest. The interest conflict between these 
two classes is caused by its social condition based on private property. Marx believes 
that this seeming contradiction is in practice constantly “destroyed and reproduced,” 
until a communist society is established. In a communist society, class struggle will 
disappear, so will the unnecessary conflict between one another classes. Self-interest 
and common interest will be harmonious with each other. Maybe to some extent, 
there will be no concern for self-interest any more, as Marx states, “In a true state it is 
not a question of the possibility of every citizen to dedicate himself to the universal in 
the form of a particular class, but of the capability of the universal class to be really 
universal, i.e., to be the class of every citizen” (Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy, p. 47). 
That is to say, for Marx, in a communist society where everyone is in the universal 
class, every citizen can dedicate oneself to common interest and make self-interest 
consistent to common interest.  
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To summarize this section, for Marx, concern for self-interest is neutral rather 
than negative, to what extent people are concerned for self-interest is determined by 
different social conditions where people live. If people demonstrate selfishness or 
egoism when pursuing their own interests, this is determined by their social 
conditions. Moreover, for Marx, egoism is not some something that can be overcome 
through self-restrain. Marx suggests that if people want to eliminate egoism, they 
should focus on the abolishment of social conditions that cause egoism, rather then to 
control or suppress their desires. Finally, Marx believes that self-interest is not 
necessarily in conflict with common interest. Instead, self-interest is the basis for 
common interest. 
4. Conclusion 
    For Marx, happiness is one of the highest goods of human beings; happiness is 
not superior to other highest goods such as freedom and self-realization of human 
essence. According to Marx, private property causes alienation of human beings: that 
is, human beings are alienated not only from what they have created through their 
labor, but also human beings are alienated from one another. People will not be happy 
as long as this alienation exists. As a result, Marx argues that people should abolish 
private property in order to achieve really happy lives. In addition, Marx believes that 
voluntary labor leads to happiness, while involuntary labor leads to unhappiness. 
Moreover, Marx believes that concern for self-interest is a social consciousness 
caused by social conditions, and self-interest itself is neither blameworthy nor 
praiseworthy.  
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CHAPTER 4: COMPARISON AND ANALYSIS OF 
ARISTOTLE’S AND MARX’S VIEWS OF HAPPINESS 
    Based on the previous discussion of both Aristotle’s and Marx’s view of 
happiness, we can find both agreement and disagreement between them on different 
issues, such as “What is the highest good of human beings?” and “What contributes to 
happiness?” Aristotle conceives happiness as the highest good of human beings, while 
Marx suggests other options as the highest good(s), such as freedom and 
self-realization of human essence. Also, Aristotle stresses the significance of 
voluntary virtue, while Marx tends to doubt this significance. Regarding the issue of 
self-interest, both Aristotle and Marx justify the appropriate concern of self-interest. 
However, Aristotle believes that the maintenance of private property benefits 
self-interest and common interest, while Marx insists that the abolishment of private 
property is the only way to benefit everyone. In this section, I compare their views 
regarding happiness, morality, voluntary virtue, and self-interest.  
1. Is Happiness the Highest Good among all Kinds of Good?   
Marx tends to conceive communism as the highest good because for Marx, 
communism represents the only perfect way that people manage their lives and enjoy 
happiness. According to Marx, communism implies the realization of not only 
happiness, but also of emancipation, liberty, freedom, self-assertion, all-sided 
development, and so forth. That is, for Marx, communism implies a perfect life, 
which embraces all kinds of necessary and important things for human beings, 
including happiness. In contrast, Aristotle conceives of happiness as the highest good. 
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According to Aristotle, if we call something the highest good, we mean that we desire 
this thing for its own sake rather than anything else. For other goods, we can provide 
an answer to “What do we want this good for?” For instance, we want delicious food 
for health, for pleasure and so forth. However, we desire happiness just for happiness; 
there is no further goal after we have achieved happiness. We cannot find a plausible 
answer to “What do we want happiness for?” because there is nothing else beyond 
happiness that people pursue. In this sense, Aristotle believes happiness is the ultimate 
good that people desire. 
Although Marx would not view happiness as the highest good of human beings, 
he tends to agree with Aristotle that the highest good of human beings, if there is such 
a good, is essentially a kind of life. For Marx, everyone in, and only in, a communist 
society can have this life. If we suppose communism is the highest good, then we can 
still continue our inquiry of “What do we want communism for?” In this case, “we 
want communism for communism” is not a convincing answer. For instance, one may 
argue that we want communism because in the communist society we human beings 
can emancipate ourselves and can all have happy lives. In this sense, we want 
communism not for its own sake, but for a perfect life there. If someone insists that 
communism is the highest good, then in this way, happiness and communism may be 
synonyms to each other, both referring to something good or perfect that we want for 
its own sake and something which embraces other good things and lacks nothing.  
However, even if happiness and communism may be synonyms in terms of a 
perfect kind of life, I argue that happiness rather than communism is a better answer 
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to the question “What is the highest good?” My argument is based on the following 
consideration. First of all, communism, although we can conceive of it as a particular 
life, generally refers to a way to manage a society. That is, the core meaning of 
communism centers on management rather than life, as how communism is 
commonly interpreted. Society management could be a sub-concept of life; for 
instance, how we manage a state in a given society is one aspect of a particular life in 
that society. In this sense, society management may be a subordinate and dependent 
concept of life; consequently, happiness rather than communism represents a higher 
concept of human beings.  
Second, when we attempt to explain why communism is the highest good, 
usually we need to use happiness as a dimension to describe how good communism is 
for human beings. For instance, we may say communism is the highest good because 
in a communist society everyone enjoys happiness. In this sense, it implies that 
happiness is either easier to understand, or happiness is the ultimate goal of human 
life compared to communism.  
Finally, happiness, as Aristotle suggests as the highest good of human beings, 
involves both happiness of an individual and happiness of others. In light of Aristotle, 
happiness is both an individually-oriented and a state-oriented concept. Aristotle 
believes happiness involves both happiness of an individual and happiness of others. 
Also, Aristotle focuses on a happy state where everyone does well and lives well, that 
is, happiness of individuals contributes to a happy state. Aristotle's conception of 
happiness follows the line from happiness of individuals to happiness of a state. In 
	  
	  
	  
62	  
contrast, communism is a society-oriented concept in Marx’s view. That is, 
communism is not about any single individual’s life but a life that constituted by all 
the people (as a group) of a communist society. When Marx talks about happiness, he 
focuses on happiness of the entire human species rather than that of individuals. In 
this sense, Marx’s conception of happiness may follow the line from society to 
individuals. In practice, it is not that we human beings create a happy state first, and 
then enjoy the happiness derived from the happy state. Rather, society is constituted 
of individuals; happiness of a state or society is based on happiness of individuals and 
is achieved based on the achievement of individuals’ happiness. As a result, it is 
necessary to conceive of the highest good of human beings not only from the 
perspective of a state or society, but also from the perspective of individuals. In this 
sense, happiness, based on the highest good for both individuals and a state is better 
than communism to be viewed as the highest good of human beings, which centers 
mainly on a society rather than individuals.  
2. What Contributes to the Highest Good? 
    Aristotle states, “the activity of this in accordance with its proper virtue will be 
perfect happiness” (NE, Book X). For Aristotle, being in accordance with virtue leads 
to happiness. As a result, Aristotle suggests that to cultivate virtue is the most 
important means to achieve happiness. In contrast, Marx rejects the significance of 
morality or virtue, and he argues that in order to achieve the highest good 
(communism in Marx’s view) people need to abolish the basis for their unhappiness, 
which is private property and alienation based on it. In this sense, Marx questions the 
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necessity to teach morality or virtue in contrast to what Aristotle insists. Then, the 
first question is “Do human beings need morality and virtue?” 
    Marx tends to say “No.” He argues that in a communist society, all morality, 
religion, and virtue will disappear. Also, he insists that in a communist society 
everyone will dedicate oneself to others. Since dedicating oneself to others is a 
particular virtue that is valued nowadays in many societies, let us use it as an example 
to discuss whether human beings need virtue. The reason that we believe dedication is 
a virtue is that it illustrates a certain kind of good or excellence in human character. 
We value it because in many cases people behave oppositely, that is, rather than 
dedicating oneself to others, people tend not to do so. According to Marx, everyone 
can be dedicated in a communist society; that is, dedication, as a particular character 
trait, will not disappear. Rather, people in a communist society will not identify 
dedication as a virtue, since everyone naturally behaves in a dedicated way. In this 
sense, in a communist society, people still need good character traits such as 
dedication, but people will not name them as morality or virtue.  
    Similarly, in light of Marx, people in a communist society will be honest, 
righteous, hardworking, and so forth. Everyone there performs these good character 
traits naturally, and nobody would behave reversely. In this sense, it is not that virtue 
or morality disappears in a communist society; instead, immoral or bad behavior will 
disappear there. By proposing that all morality and religion will disappear in a 
communist society, Marx refers to those morality and religious virtues that are used as 
ruling tools in a capitalist society, and he believes they will no longer exist in a 
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communist society. Moreover, virtue such as dedication and honesty will become 
human beings’ second nature or even nature in a communist society, but people would 
not call them virtue. Additionally, virtue would not be distinguished from what we are 
considered immoral today, and immorality would ultimately disappear in a 
communist society. As a result, people in a communist society still possess and need 
what we call morality or virtue today. 
    Even if Marx is correct that happiness has nothing to do with morality or virtue, 
and people would be automatically happy in a communist society. The question 
remains “How should people treat morality or virtue before the establishment of 
communism?” Should people totally ignore morality and virtue in order to achieve 
happiness, because according to Marx by following moral principles one would not 
achieve real happiness? If people reject morality or virtue now, then how would 
people determine whether an action is right or wrong? Without moral principles, 
wouldn’t people just follow their instincts or act randomly? In that case, wouldn’t 
people become barbarians or beasts and by no means realize their human essence? 
Marx does not discuss in detail how people would treat morality or virtue before 
communism is successfully constituted. However, given the fact that morality and 
virtue has existed and will exist for a long time, also, given the importance and 
necessity of morality and virtue in regulating humans’ behaviors, it is not wise for us 
to reject morality or virtue right away. Rather, it would be worthy of us to consider 
how to cultivate morality and virtue in people and to avoid using them as ruling 
means. 
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    Next, let us explore whether morality or virtue contributes to happiness. 
Supposed they do not. Then, the question is “What contributes to happiness?” Besides 
virtue, they are many other desirable things make people happy, such as wealth, honor, 
love, and so forth. Would they contribute to happiness? The answer is “Yes, but not 
necessarily." For instance, we have heard that many wealthy people are complaining 
that they are not happy. Sometimes wealthy people identify themselves as the poor 
who have only money but nothing else, which makes them unhappy. This is probably 
because they don’t know how to utilize their wealth to pursue happiness. To properly 
use wealth is an issue based on rational principles. That is, it is necessary to involve 
morality or virtue for one to utilize wealth to pursue happiness. For instance, wealthy 
people can donate money to help people in need and to make their lives better. If the 
wealthy people are happy for helping others, it is not because they are rich but 
because they are helping. Wealth, in this case, is the condition to enable wealthy 
people to be happily helping others. That is, helping others is the particular virtue that 
makes wealthy people happy. 
    Similarly, honor may contribute to happiness, but not necessarily so. Some 
people with great honor are not happy because they are suffering from all kinds of 
stress aroused by their success. There are examples where successful people try to 
avoid being honored by the public to maintain their quiet lives. If honor contributes to 
happiness, then why do these people avoid honor rather than pursuing it? One may 
argue that it is because honor may cause some disadvantages such as stress, though 
honor contributes to happiness. According to Aristotle, happiness is the most 
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desirable thing of human beings, and it lacks nothing. If happiness aroused by honor 
is also accompanied by painful things such as stress, then, this kind of happiness is 
not genuine or perfect in light of Aristotle.  
    Love also makes people happy in many cases. Both being loved and giving love 
to others can lead to happiness. However, too much love may become dotage and 
cause spoiling, which is not desirable for human beings. In addition, not all kinds of 
love contribute to happiness. For instance, love could become troublesome if one’s 
love is not welcomed by another. That is, only proper love at a proper time 
contributes to happiness. In order to love properly, rational principles for love are 
necessary. These principles are within the scope of morality or virtue. In a word, 
many desirable things such as wealth, honor, and love contribute to but do not 
necessarily lead to happiness. If they do, they need the guidance of morality or virtue. 
    Another possible element that contributes to happiness is chance. Aristotle 
rejects this idea by saying “To entrust to chance what is greatest and most noble 
would be a very defective arrangement” (NE, Book I). If people rely on chance to 
give them happiness, then, people would not take any effort to learn anything that 
would contribute to happiness. Marx would call this behavior self-denial of human 
essence, that is, people act in a way that they are rejecting their potentials and 
possibilities to become better as human beings. For both Aristotle and Marx, chance is 
never a determinant factor of happiness. Otherwise, for those people who have bad 
fortune, their lives do not deserve living at all because they may be destined to be 
unhappy forever. 
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In contrast, being accordance with virtue solely can contribute to happiness. That is, 
even if without other desirable things such as wealth or honor, virtue itself can lead to 
happiness. A virtuous person may be poor. However, when this person exercises 
virtuous actions, he or she may be truly happy, even though being poor is generally a 
painful rather than pleasant thing. Also, this person’s virtuous actions may not be 
honored or even recognized by others, but still this virtuous person is happy without 
possessing honor. In addition, virtue is consistent with rational principles; it is related 
to the rational part of the soul. On the contrary, wealth, honor, and love may be 
related to people’s irrational parts of the soul. Without the instruction of the rational 
part of the soul, people’s pursuits of other desirable things could be inappropriate, 
which may lead to unhappiness. Virtue guides a person to properly pursue desirable 
things such as wealth and honor and to use them appropriately, so that people can 
pursue happiness.  
    In this sense, Aristotle’s argument regarding happiness and virtue makes more 
sense than Marx’s. According to Aristotle, happiness is a kind of life that embraces all 
kinds of good; also, it is the highest good, which embraces good not only for 
individuals but also for a state as a whole. Meanwhile, Aristotle believes that virtue is 
an excellence (the highest form of a particular good), which is based on rational 
principles and makes a thing/person good and work well. In this sense, virtue or 
excellence based on rational principles is the foundation of happiness in light of 
Aristotle. Based on my previous discussion, many other desirable things such as 
wealth and honor benefit happiness but do not necessarily lead to happiness. In 
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contrast, morality or virtue solely can make a person happy. Moreover, morality and 
virtue will still exist until someday when people are naturally virtuous. As a result, 
Aristotle’s argument regarding happiness and virtue inspires us to teach morality or 
virtue to benefit everyone’s happy life.  
3. Is Voluntary Virtue Better than Involuntary Virtue? 
    Based on Aristotle’s arguments regarding voluntary actions and involuntary 
actions, he believes that in the sphere of virtue, voluntary virtue is better than 
involuntary virtue. This argument is based on Aristotle’s conception of happiness. 
According to Aristotle, in order to be completely or perfectly happy, one should 
always be in accordance with virtue. However, if a person exercises virtue without 
deliberation, or if this person’s virtuous actions are moved by some outside principles, 
Aristotle argues that this person may not gain happiness from his or her virtuous 
action because he or she does not have a desire in doing so. He or she either exercises 
a virtuous action by force, or he or she happens to perform it accidently. In these two 
cases, the person may not have pleasure in performing the virtuous actions. According 
to Aristotle, if a person cannot enjoy virtuous action, he or she can hardly be called a 
virtuous person; neither would he or she gain happiness through that virtuous action. 
That is, Aristotle thinks that the person is not happy when he or she involuntarily 
performs that virtuous action. 
    One may argue that a person can still be happy for an involuntarily virtuous 
action. For instance, a person may incidentally help others, and he will be happy for 
the outcome, though he did not mean to help others. However, this kind of happiness 
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is not perfect, according to Aristotle. It seems to Aristotle that chance rather than 
one’s reason or rational part in the soul contributes to this kind of happiness. That is, 
for Aristotle, happiness derived from involuntary virtue would be inferior to 
happiness based on voluntary virtue. In this sense, Aristotle would argue voluntary 
virtue contributes more to happiness rather than involuntary virtue. 
Would Marx agree with Aristotle that voluntary virtue is better than involuntary 
virtue, based on his arguments on voluntary labor? As discussed before, since Marx 
rejects the significance of virtue or morality, he may have little interest in answering 
this question. Or at least, Marx would first ask, “What kind of morality are we talking 
about?” For instance, if it only involves the bourgeois’ morality, which for Marx is a 
means to oppress and tame the proletariat, then his answer would be “involuntary 
virtue is better than voluntary.” First of all, for Marx, if workers voluntarily exercise 
bourgeois’ morality such as submission, it implies that the capitalists have 
successfully brainwashed the workers. It also implies that the workers have largely 
internalized the bourgeois’ morality. On the contrary, if workers involuntarily perform 
the bourgeois’ morality, it implies, to some extent, the workers resist this morality. 
This resistance, for Marx, is a promising power to be aroused in the workers and to 
lead them to rebel against the bourgeois’ exploitation. However, when it comes to the 
case of labor, Marx definitely believes that voluntary labor is necessary to happiness, 
because people can realize their human essence only through voluntary labor. 
Also, Marx would agree with Aristotle that a moving principle inside contributes 
to happiness more than a moving principle outside. Suppose happiness is a destination 
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where many people want to arrive. Some people purposefully walk toward there, 
while others barely move but happen to be delivered there by a wind or be dragged 
there by someone else. In this case, Aristotle believes that the former group of people 
are moved by moving principles in a person, while the latter being moved by moving 
principles in the abstract. For Aristotle, although both groups of people arrived at the 
destination happiness, the former contribute more to this arriving than the latter. What 
Aristotle emphasizes is that when a person voluntarily initiates a virtuous action, and 
he or she enjoys performing this virtuous action, this is much better than when he or 
she is forced to or accidently exercises the virtuous action. With regards to Marx’s 
argument of voluntary labor and involuntary labor, since workers who labor 
voluntarily can cooperate well with each other and can completely enjoy their 
working productions, the workers have desire to labor; and they are move by moving 
principles in a person. On the other hand, for those workers who labor involuntarily, 
they are forced to work rather than having a desire to work, consequently, they are 
moved by moving principles in the abstract.  
To summarize the discussion of voluntary virtue, Marx agrees with Aristotle that 
moving principles in a person contribute more to happiness than external moving 
principles. In this sense, if we expect people to behave in certain way, for instance to 
voluntarily labor in light of Marx and to be voluntarily virtuous in light of Aristotle, it 
is important for us to arouse moving principles inside rather than imposing outside 
moving principles on people. However, when it comes to dealing with a particular 
virtue, which can be used as a ruling tool, then, Marx reminds us to be cautious to 
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cultivate this kind of virtue. For instance, when attempting to cultivate obedience as a 
particular virtue, it is worthy of us to first justify that when and how obedience is a 
virtue. It is also worthy of us to think that whether cultivating this virtue contributes to 
happiness.  
4. Is Habituation a Necessary Way to Cultivate Voluntary Virtue? 
    Aristotle believes it is. For Aristotle, before being taught or trained to be 
virtuous, people, average people in particular, tend to behave reversely. For instance, 
people tend to unlimitedly satisfy their desires and needs due to people’s ignorance of 
virtue, and this tendency is opposite to what Aristotle calls continence, a particular 
moral virtue. Also, after being taught moral virtue or moral principles, average 
people, according to Aristotle, may still behave oppositely. For instance, sometimes 
people know that it is good for them to be continent, but still they refuse to do so. 
Aristotle believes that this is because there is something in human nature that is 
opposite to moral virtues. That is, for Aristotle, people’s resistance to moral virtue 
comes from their nature. Aristotle attributes this resistance to the irrational parts of the 
soul, and he argues that the irrational parts of the soul may hinder one’s being 
virtuous. Since according to Aristotle, moral virtues do not exist in human nature, and 
they usually encounter the resistance in human nature, people need to be trained to be 
virtuous.  
    Aristotle proposes that habituation is a necessary way to cultivate moral virtue in 
people, average people and slaves in particular, who do not have the wisdom to know 
what is really good for them. For Aristotle, although the irrational parts of the soul in 
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human nature resist moral virtue, this does not suggest that moral virtue cannot be 
cultivated because the rational part of the soul is ready to receive moral virtue. As he 
says, “we are adapted by nature to receive them [moral virtue], and are made perfect 
by habit” (NE, Book II). That is, human nature provides not only resistance, but also 
and more important, the potentials for people to receive and internalize moral virtue. 
In this sense, habituation is necessary for human beings to cultivate moral virtue in 
themselves. Aristotle states, “moral virtue comes about as a result of habit” (NE, 
Book II). He also states, “we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing 
temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts” (NE, Book II). This indicates that for 
Aristotle, continuous performing certain virtue contributes to the cultivation of these 
virtues.  
    Then, does Aristotle believe that habituation contributes to the cultivation of 
voluntary virtue? Aristotle tends to say “yes,” because he believes that human beings 
are “made perfect by habit” (NE, Book II). Since for Aristotle, voluntary virtue 
contributes more to happiness than involuntary virtue, and involuntary virtue may 
lead to happiness, but not the perfect happiness, then, only voluntary virtue rather than 
involuntary virtue contributes to the perfectness of human beings. In addition, 
Aristotle quotes Evenus’ words, “I say that habit's but a long practice, friend, and this 
becomes men's nature in the end” (NE, Book II). That is to say, for Aristotle, people 
will finally exercise virtue voluntarily, when moral virtue becomes their nature 
through habituation. In this sense, for Aristotle, habituation is not only a necessary 
way to overcome ignorance and resistance to moral virtue, but also a necessary way to 
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cultivate voluntary virtue, because only voluntary virtue contributes to perfect 
happiness.  
    Although Aristotle has a strong belief in cultivating voluntary virtue in people 
through habituation, he also suggests that habituation may not work well on everyone 
in virtue cultivation. His arguments are based on the following considerations: 
a) Habituation cannot change all the people to the same degree.  
b) Through habituation, not only moral virtue can be cultivated in people, but 
also bad habits to destroy virtue can be cultivated.  
First of all, habituation may not work on people to the same degree in virtue 
cultivation. For Aristotle, different classes of people have different qualities; some 
classes are superior to others, in terms of intellect and capacities. Also, Aristotle 
believes that different classes may possess different virtues; some virtues may not be 
possessed by all. For instance, Guardians have virtues that common people and slaves 
do not have, because according to Aristotle, the former have intellectual wisdom 
while the latter do not. As a result, Aristotle argues that it may be easier to cultivate 
moral virtue in some people but much more difficult in others. For instance, Aristotle 
believes that continence is cultivated more in excitable people than “those who 
deliberate but do not abide by their decisions” (NE, Book VII).  
Second, Aristotle believes that both virtue and evil can be cultivated through the 
process of habituation. He says, “Again, it is from the same causes and by the same 
means that every virtue is both produced and destroyed” (NE, Book II). According to 
Aristotle, just as both a good player and bad player are produced by practice 
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lyre-playing, good and bad habits are produced through habituation, so are good and 
bad character traits. That is, sometimes virtue cultivation through habituation may go 
off the track: instead of cultivating moral virtue in people; habituation arouses and 
cultivates some bad habits.  
Aristotle’s considerations of habituation remind us of some potential difficulties 
in virtue cultivation through habit. However, it is not a good way to identify 
differences among people based on a class hierarchy, as Aristotle suggests. People’s 
intellectual or capacities differ from one another, but not in a superior or inferior way. 
Also, the difference is not determined by birth only and cannot be changed through 
practice. As a result, although through the same process of habituation, moral virtue 
can be cultivated more in some people and less in others, this does not suggest that 
habituation cannot work on the latter. It suggests that it may take longer to cultivate 
virtue in certain people through habituation. Although bad habits can also be 
produced and cultivated in people through habituation, it does not suggest that 
habituation is not a good way to cultivate virtue. Rather, it reminds us to avoid 
cultivating bad habits through habituation. 
    In contrast, for Marx, it is not necessary to cultivate morality or virtue in people. 
For instance, Marx believes that in a communist society everyone would be selfless, 
this selflessness is not a virtue being directly cultivated through habituation but a 
natural outcome in a communist society. Also, Marx tends to reject cultivating 
voluntary virtue through habituation, because he argues that the purpose of this 
habituation could be to oppress the ruled class in a class society. If it is the case, then, 
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Marx doubts that this kind of voluntary virtue contributes to happiness. For Marx, if 
people voluntarily exercise this kind of virtue, it may be very difficult to arouse a 
consciousness of rejection to this virtue in order to pursue real happiness.  
    In addition, Marx argues that it may be fruitless to attempt to replace involuntary 
virtue with voluntary ones, because according to Marx, people’s resistance or 
involuntariness to particular virtue is determined by their existing social 
circumstances. For instance, in a capitalist society where human beings are alienated 
from one another, people tend to compete with and even antagonize each other rather 
than cooperate with one another. This alienated human relationship, according to 
Marx, is determined by the productive forces and the relation of production at that 
time. As a result, people are doomed to compete with and antagonize one another, as 
long as the social conditions maintain. In this sense, Marx argues that it may be 
fruitless to cultivate the virtue of cooperation in people in a capitalist society because 
people tend to behave reversely, and this tendency cannot be eliminated in a capitalist 
society. For Marx, voluntary cooperation cannot be achieved through habituation. 
    Compared to Aristotle, Marx demonstrates little support to habituation as a 
necessary way to cultivate voluntary virtue. Marx reminds us that virtue cultivation 
cannot be applied in a vacuum environment; that is, in order to cultivate virtue, it is 
worthy of people to take into consideration the social conditions of a given society. 
This may help people determine whether a virtue is actually a virtue, or if it is just a 
means to oppress the people. 
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5. What Is the Relation between Happiness and Achievement and/or Sacrifice of 
Self-interest? 
For Aristotle, both advancement of self-interest and sacrifice of self-interest, at a 
proper time and to a proper degree, may lead to happiness. Aristotle believes that 
appropriate self-interest is positive in humans’ development. By appropriate, Aristotle 
emphasizes that the concern of self-interest should not be excessive, otherwise it 
becomes egoism, which is criticized by Aristotle. For Aristotle, when people are 
appropriately concerned for self-interest, they will focus on making their personal 
progress. According to Aristotle, the more progress one has made, the more one may 
contribute to a state. For instance, one may pay more tax, which in turn would be used 
to improve people’ lives. In this way, appropriate self-interest contributes to 
happiness. Meanwhile, Aristotle believes that sacrifice of self-interest is a noble virtue. 
Since virtue also leads to happiness, Aristotle believes that sacrifice of self-interest 
also contributes to happiness.  
For Marx, self-interest is the starting point of human lives. In order to survive, 
one has to first act in the interest in self, such as to first satisfy one’s own needs and 
desires. Otherwise, one may suffer from unsatisfied needs, such as hunger. In this 
sense, Marx agrees with Aristotle that self-interest contributes to happiness. Also, 
Marx values sacrifice of self-interest, although he dose not directly state this in his 
work. He argues that in a capitalist society, everyone competes with each other and 
people tend to be egoistic to survive; in contrast, in a communist society everyone can 
dedicate oneself to others, that is, in a communist society everyone can sacrifice 
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self-interest for others. Marx’s comparison between a capitalist society and a 
communist society indicates that he agrees with Aristotle that self-sacrifice is valuable 
and good for human beings. However, because Marx rejects morality and virtue, he 
would not identify self-sacrifice as a virtue as Aristotle does. Instead, Marx believes 
that sacrifice self-interest for all is natural in a communist society; people do not need 
to struggle with their resistance to sacrifice, which resides in human nature.  
Aristotle disagrees with Marx that everyone can dedicate oneself to all. For 
Aristotle, only few people, such as philosophers, can be only concerned for others’ 
interests without considering one’s own. This difference is related to their conceptions 
of private property. For Aristotle, private property should be kept for a good 
management of a state; while for Marx, private property should be abolished to 
constitute a communist society. In a society based on private property, one’s sacrifice 
of self-interest may make oneself disadvantaged, because this sacrifice usually 
benefits others rather than oneself. For instance, if I have five dollars, and you have 
five dollars as well, if I sacrifice my self-interest by giving you my five dollars 
without any compensation from you, then, this sacrifice benefits you rather than me 
because it increases your money by reducing mine. If someone continues to sacrifice 
self-interest in this way, then one may find difficulties in maintaining one’s own life, 
especially when others refuse to sacrifice their self-interest to help this person. If one 
hardly maintains one’s own life, how could one have a happy life? In this sense, 
Aristotle insists that sacrifice of self-interest, though as noble as it is, may not always 
lead to happiness. For Aristotle, it is natural for one to first act in the interest in self 
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and few people would always sacrifice for others without first considering 
self-interest. 
In contrast, according to Marx, in a communist society, social products is 
managed and distributed on a communal basis. People in that society share social 
property together, and people do not desire to possess any property as one’s own. In 
this sense, self-interest is consistent with common interest. If one dedicates oneself to 
all, he or she does not need to worry about being disadvantaged by this sacrifice 
because others would sacrifice their self-interest for him or her in the same way. For 
instance, if I give you my five dollars (suppose currency is still used in a communist 
society), you or someone else would definitely give me your/his/her money when I 
am in need. That is, in a communist society, people are mutually altruistic to each 
other. As a result, it is possible for people in a communist society to be concerned 
only for others’ interests. 
Aristotle argues that a society where private property is not allowed would 
become chaotic because people would be confused with and quarreling about their 
responsibilities and rights. He points out, for example, a wife may decide to clean 
only the house where she lives and refuse to clean others’ houses because she does 
not live there. However, according to the communal arrangement, everything is 
commonly shared, and consequently she has the obligation to clean others’ houses. If 
she refuses to clean others’ houses, quarreling may arise because other housewives 
fulfill their duties. In this way, Aristotle believes that people would quarrel over every 
trivial thing in a communal society. However, Marx would argue that this potential 
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quarreling is still based on private property, which makes people identify things as 
yours, mine, theirs, and so forth. In a communist society, for Marx, it is impossible 
that a wife would refuse to clean all the houses because it is natural for her to do so, 
just as she needs to eat and drink. Neither does Marx believe that quarrels suggested 
by Aristotle would happen in a communist society.  
In a word, both Aristotle and Marx agree that to advance self-interest contributes 
to happiness. Regarding whether sacrifice of self-interest contributes to happiness, 
Aristotle tends to say “It depends,” while Marx tends to say “Yes.” Aristotle argues 
that if one is only concerned for others’ interests, one may end up unhappily. Aristotle 
believes that sacrifice of self-interest should be maintained at a certain degree to 
contribute to happiness. Marx, on the contrary, believes that sacrifice of self-interest 
for all is not only necessary but also natural in a communist society, where everyone 
has a happy life. 
6. How to Overcome Egoism? 
For Aristotle, if one is excessively or exclusively concerned for self-interest, then 
one is egoistic. Egoism, or selfishness, is criticized by Aristotle to be a deficiency in 
one’s character. According to Aristotle, both excess and defect are bad for human 
beings. As a result, he believes that excessive concern of self-interest, or egoism, 
should be censured. In contrast, Mars does not believe that egoism is blameworthy. 
For Marx, egoism, just like selflessness, is a particular social consciousness derived 
from certain social conditions. Marx does not believe egoism, as that a particular 
social consciousness, deserves blames; rather, certain social conditions that cause 
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egoism, private property in particular, is responsible for peoples’ blames on egoism. 
Given their different identities and attributions to egoism, Aristotle and Marx provide 
different ways to overcome or eliminate egoism. Aristotle suggests cultivating in 
people virtues contrary to egoism; while Marx suggests abolishing private property, 
the basis of egoism. 
    Since according to Aristotle, excessive concern of self-interest is egoism, at least 
there are two kinds of virtues are contrary to and can bridle egoism. On the one hand, 
one needs to be cultivated with virtues related to self-control or self-restraint such as 
temperance, which help a person to hold back excessive concern of self-interest. As 
he says, “the temperate man craves for the things be ought, as he ought, as when he 
ought; and when he ought; and this is what the rational principle directs” (NE, Book 
III). For Aristotle, one’s concern for self-interest, just as one’s desires for other good 
things, should be kept at a proper time and to a proper degree. In this sense, virtues 
based on self-control contribute to keeping one’s concern of self-interest properly. On 
the other hand, Aristotle suggests that virtues related to selflessness such as 
benevolence and generosity can also be cultivated, which help people be concerned 
for not only self-interest but also others’ interests in a proper way. Since selflessness 
and egoism are opposite to each other, once a person becomes selfless, that is to be 
first concerned for others’ interests, this person may no longer be egoist. As a result, 
these two kinds of virtues are helpful in overcoming or even eliminate egoism, 
according to Aristotle. 
However, one thing that needs to be pointed out is Aristotle’s argument 
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regarding excessive or inappropriate concerns or desires is based on his conception of 
a hierarchical state. Aristotle believes that in an ideal state, different people ought to 
crave for different things3. For instance, what a king ought to desire is different from 
what a slave or craftsman does. What a person ought to desire, for Aristotle, is 
determined by this person’s position in a state. That is, if a craft person desires good 
ruling of state rather than making good crafts, according to Aristotle, this desire is 
inappropriate. However, in today’s egalitarian societies, it is discriminative and unfair 
to regulate what one ought to desire based on one’s social position or status. 
Nevertheless, excessive or exclusive concern for self-interest is still identified as 
egoism, which is generally believed morally wrong. For instance, if one is an egoist 
and is concerned for only self-interest, one tends to advance self-interest by any 
means, including means that would do harm to others. In this way, one may view 
others as means to advance one’s own interest rather than as human beings. If 
everyone in a society is egoistic, the human relation there would be terribly 
ant agonistic, because others are either hindrance or means to advance one’s 
self-interest. In this sense, Aristotle’s suggestion on how to overcome egoism is 
practical and inspiring in today’s world. 
In contrast, Marx’s suggestion on how to overcome or eliminate egoism is not 
from a moral perspective. Instead, Marx suggests that to abolish private property and 
to constitute a communist society is the only way to eliminate egoism because egoism 
is only a social consciousness derived from private property. Also, Marx would reject 
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   In	  Nicomachean	  Ethics,	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  For	  instance,	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the Aristotelian approach to overcome egoism, that is, to cultivate virtues that are 
contrary to egoism. First of all, Marx does not identify one’s desires as either 
appropriate or excessive; consequently he argues that it is not necessary for one to 
control one’s desires. Rather, Marx identifies desires as general desires, such as eating 
and drinking, or abnormally developed desired such as capitalists’ desires for 
maximizing the surplus value.  
Regarding these two kinds of desires, Marx states: 
Communist organization has a twofold effect on the desires produced in the 
individual by present-day relations; some of these desires — namely 
desires which exist under all relations, and only change their form and 
direction under different social relations — are merely altered by the 
Communist social system, for they are given the opportunity to develop 
normally; but others — namely those originating solely in a particular 
society, under particular conditions of [production] and intercourse — are 
totally deprived of their conditions of existence (The German Ideology, p. 
51). 
For Marx, general desires such as eating and drinking exist across different 
social forms. These kinds of desire only change their forms but will not disappear in a 
communist society. For Marx, people in a communist society do not need to control 
their general desires because all the general desires will be satisfied there. He believes 
that a communist society “will make possible the normal satisfaction of all needs” due 
to the highly developed productive forces (The German Ideology, p. 51). On the other 
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hand, for desires originating from particular social conditions - for instance desires 
related to egoism that are aroused in a capitalist society - this kind of desire will 
disappear in a communist society because of the abolishment of its social conditions.  
In addition, due to Marx’s rejection to virtue or morality, he argues that it is not a 
good way to overcome egoism through virtue cultivation. As Marx states, “the 
liquefaction of the fixed desires and ideas” is actually an “an impotent moral 
injunction” in a capital society (The German Ideology, p.51). As long as the material 
circumstances of egoism exist, Marx believes that it is impotent to preach the virtue of 
self-control or selflessness to overcome egoism. By this argument, Marx does not 
endorse avarice or selfishness. His point is to teach morality or virtue without 
changing what causes egoism; this kind work is impotent.  
To summarize, for Aristotle, egoism is evil and needs to be censured. A good 
way to overcome or eliminate egoism is to cultivate in people virtues contrary to 
egoism. For Marx, egoism is neutral rather than negative; it is determined by its social 
conditions. Also, Marx rejects that virtue cultivation is a good way to overcome 
egoism, but the abolishment of private property is.  
7. Conclusion 
My comparison and analysis of Aristotle’s and Marx’s views of happiness is 
based on several questions. Their answers to these questions are largely different for 
each other. Aristotle believes that happiness is the highest good, and in order to 
achieve this highest good, peoples should be in accordance with virtue. In contrast, 
Marx argues that communism is the highest good, if there is such a hierarchy of good 
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things. Also he argues that freedom, self-realization of human essence, and all-sided 
development are as equivalently important to human beings as happiness. As a result, 
for Marx, in order to achieve happy lives for all the people, the establishment of 
communism is the precondition. In addition, Aristotle believes that voluntary virtue 
contributes more to happiness than involuntary virtue, and he also believes that 
habituation is a necessary way to cultivate voluntary virtue. On the other hand, Marx, 
although he believes that voluntary labor contributes to happiness, while involuntary 
labor causes unhappiness, argues that voluntary virtue may not necessarily lead to 
happiness. Moreover, Marx doubts habituation is a necessary way to cultivate 
voluntary virtue. Finally, both Aristotle and Marx believe that advancement and 
sacrifice of self-interest can both contribute to happiness. Aristotle emphasizes the 
appropriateness of concern and/or sacrifice of self-interest, while Marx focuses on 
their social conditions. Aristotle suggests that virtue cultivation can overcome egoism, 
while Marx suggests that people should abolish private property to eliminate egoism.  
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CHAPTER 5: IMPLICATIONS FOR MORAL EDUCATION 
IN MAINLAND CHINA 
In this chapter, I propose that it is worthy of us Chinese educators to reexamine 
moral education in Mainland China, the teaching of happiness in particular, in light of 
Aristotle and Marx. I address three aspects of moral education in Mainland China, 
which I believe are deserving more consideration. First of all, the “correctness” of 
students’ understandings of morality and happiness is stressed over other possible 
dimensions, such as breadth and depth. Second, students’ rote memorization of the 
“correct” view is stressed; also, students’ moral performance based on communist 
virtues in school is emphasized. However, the cultivation of voluntary virtue is 
ignored, compared to the emphasis of habituation of virtuous performance. Also, 
students’ moral performance out of school seems unimportant, based on the morality 
assessment in Mainland China. Third, concern of self-interest is generally taught as 
something that students need to suppress in order to cultivate virtues such as 
selflessness and dedicating oneself to communism. However, self-interest is not 
necessarily evil; it may contribute to human beings’ development and happiness. 
Based on my discussion in the previous chapters, I pose that it is worthy of us Chinese 
educators to reconsider at least these three aspects of moral education in Mainland 
China.  
For instance, the following questions deserve some exploration: 
Do we really want the only “correct” view of happiness to be taught in school? 
Why and why not? If not, what are the possible ways for educators and teachers to 
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include other views of happiness into morality courses? What might we have missed, 
if we teachers and educators focus mainly on students’ moral performance in school 
and rote memorization of the “correct” view? How might we teach students to balance 
advancement and sacrifice of self-interest, which both may lead to happiness? My 
following discussion is kept in the same framework as in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, 
from teaching of happiness in general, to voluntary virtue, and then to the teaching of 
self-interest. 
1. A Comprehensive Understanding of Happiness vs. the “Correct” One 
In Mainland China, the Marxist view of happiness is taught as the only “correct” 
view of happiness. Students are taught that communism is the highest good of human 
beings; a really happy life for all the people only exists in a communist society. 
Additionally, in order to achieve happiness, everyone should dedicate oneself to 
communism. However, it may be too assertive to claim that only one view of 
happiness is correct, because every theory may contain both correctness or plausibility 
and deficiencies or incompleteness. For instance, Marx rejects the connection between 
happiness and morality and virtue, while Aristotle insists on this connection. Based on 
my previous discussion in Chapter 4, they both make a point with their arguments. In 
addition, Marxism, as correct as it is presupposed , may be misunderstood in 
Mainland China. For instance, the concern of self-interest is treated as egoism in the 
Chinese context, and the censure on self-interest, according to the government, is 
based on Marxism. However, Marx himself does not directly criticize self-interest or 
even egoism in his work. Moreover, it may narrow down students’ vision to view 
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happiness by teaching them only one “correct” view. Also, it would be problematic to 
identify different views of happiness as either correct or incorrect. Correctness or 
incorrectness may not be a good standard, or at least not the only appropriate one, to 
evaluate ethical theories. 
Given all these potential problems caused by teaching Marxism as the only 
“correct” view, I argue that it would be worthy of us educators to redesign morality 
courses based on a comprehensive understanding of happiness in order to improve our 
teaching practice. 
    a) A comprehensive understanding of happiness involves more than one 
view of happiness.  
Many scholars and philosophers provide valuable thoughts regarding happiness, 
besides Marx and Aristotle. For instance, for utilitarians, happiness is to maximize 
pleasure for the most people while minimize pains. This view seems to make a point, 
because in some cases happiness for all is hardly achieved based on Aristotle’s or 
Marx’s views. For instance, in a non-communist society, happiness for all is 
impossible, according to Marx. In this kind of society, some people tend to be 
unhappy anyhow, even though they are following moral principles and trying to be 
virtuous. It is arguable why someone is unhappy anyway, but utilitarians make a point 
here by attempting to maximize happiness for the most people. In addition, for 
Kantians, happiness is not necessarily related to morality or virtue. This argument 
does not suggest that Kantians disregard happiness; rather, Kantians doubt that moral 
principles created by human beings always represent the truth. In this sense, Kantians 
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agree with Marx that when moral principles are not the truth or really good, they lead 
to evil rather than happiness. Kantians also make a legitimate point because when 
ruling class uses morality as a means of ruling, moral principles may not be the truth 
and may cause unhappiness. 
It is impossible to find an irrefutable view regarding happiness because human 
lives and ethical issues are complicated. Furthermore, contention between different 
ethical views may contribute to the enrichment of either view, and also it may 
contribute to the development of ethical philosophy. Given the complexity of our 
lives and ethical situations, it is worthy of us Chinese educators to involve more than 
one view of morality or happiness in class rather than focusing on only the Marxist 
view. However, since there are so many valuable and inspiring views of happiness, it 
may be difficult to decide which views are better than others to be included. Due to 
this reason, I am not going to suggest several views over others here.  
However, I suggest that perhaps teachers can pay more attention to those theories, 
which focus on happiness of individuals, or theories which focus on both happiness of 
individuals and a society, as the Aristotelian one. This argument is based on my 
observation of moral education in Mainland China, which focuses largely on 
happiness of the country or the society. That is, individuals seem to be the means to 
realize the happiness of the country rather than the end, and individuals’ happiness is 
largely ignored there. However, as I have discussed in Chapter 4, individuals 
contribute to the happiness of a state; at the same time, individuals’ happiness is also 
the end that people pursue. As a result, both happiness of individuals and happiness of 
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a state may deserve considerations. In this sense, I suggest it is worthy of considering 
theories of happiness which focus on not only society-orientedness but also 
individual-orientedness, such as the Aristotelian view of happiness. 
Considering the political atmosphere in Mainland China, it may not be practical 
to urge the government to include other views besides Marxism in morality textbooks. 
That is, morality textbooks are still based on the only “correct” view there. However, 
it is possible for teachers to introduce students to several views of happiness besides 
Marxism. Teachers’ selection of different views may be based on several factors, such 
as teachers’ own thinking of different views, teaching content, and schools’ tolerance 
to different views. Also, teachers may try to avoid imposing the “correctness” and 
irrefutableness of Marxism on students. Moreover, teachers may allow some 
arguments regarding Marxism, though it may be very challenging for teachers in 
Mainland China. 
    b) Families and communities may be invited to contribute to a 
comprehensive understanding of happiness. 
 A comprehensive understanding of happiness may also urge us Chinese 
educators to invite parents and communities to participate in the redesign of morality 
curriculum. Under the guidance of the only “correct” view of happiness and morality 
in Mainland China, school (as the branch of the government) is the only authority to 
teach morality or happiness. If parents hold different views other than the “correct” 
one, then parents are viewed as a hindrance to moral education. However, morality is 
not only a subject matter taught in school; rather, students may encounter moral issues 
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every day and everywhere, in and out of school. Also, parents’ different views may 
not be incorrect views; neither would their views necessarily hinder moral education. 
Rather, parents and communities may also be a valuable source to teach morality; 
consequently, it is worthy of us to think about ways to invite them into moral 
curriculum rather than ruling them out.  
For instance, the following assignments might be helpful in intriguing students’ 
exploration of happiness and also involving the participation of parents and other 
people. Teachers may ask students to interview several people including parents, 
other family members, neighbors and strangers on “What is happiness to you?” Also, 
teachers may encourage students to compare these answers with students’ own 
answers, “Are they the same?” “Why or Why not?” “Which answer(s) is/are the one(s) 
that interest you the most?” This kind of exploration may inspire students’ own 
thinking of happiness and may contribute their comprehensive understandings of 
happiness.  
2. It Is Worthy to Reconsider the Way We Teach and Assess Morality or Virtue 
in Mainland China. 
In Mainland China, the emphasis of the only “correct” view of happiness and 
morality affects the ways that happiness and morality are taught and assessed there. 
Teachers lecture on happiness and morality, based on morality textbooks. Students’ 
arguments or challenges to the “correct” view are not encouraged or even allowed. 
Students’ rote memorization of the “correct” view is tested, and their test scores are 
the components of their moral report. Also, students’ virtuous behaviors in school are 
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observed and evaluated by teachers; it is necessary for students to perform virtuous 
actions in order to have a good moral reports. The way that morality is taught and 
assessed in Mainland China implies that schools only focus on habituating students to 
“correct” morality memorization and virtuous actions in school.  
However, this kind of habituation does not necessarily result in the cultivation of 
voluntary virtue in students in Mainland China. That is, students may exhibit virtuous 
actions and “correct” virtuous knowledge without being virtuous. Voluntary virtue, 
according to Aristotle, is the goal of moral education, but voluntariness in students’ 
virtuous actions is neglected in Mainland China, in both teaching practices and 
government guidance documents. For instance, in official educational documents, 
voluntariness is seldom addressed. It seems to the government that voluntariness is 
insignificant; rather, the government assumes that students will definitely possess the 
communist virtues if the students are imposed with these virtues and are habituated to 
behaviors based on these virtues. In addition, voluntariness is also ignored in 
educational practices. For example, many schools apply forced donation as an 
approach for arousing and cultivating virtues such as fraternal love, benevolence, and 
kindness. In this particular educational practice, little attention is paid to students’ 
voluntariness to donate. Let us explore this example in detail to see how voluntariness 
in students’ virtuous behaviors is ignored. 
It is very common in Mainland China that individuals and enterprises are 
required by the government to donate when serious disasters or accidents (such as 
earthquakes or train collisions) occur. For many employees in the government, 
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schools, and any other state-owned enterprises, the donation is a direct deduction of 
their salary. For students, they are usually urged or even required by teachers to 
donate a certain amount of money. In some schools, a minimum donation would be 
suggested or implied by teachers. In general, the donor’s name and the amount of 
donation are posted publicly as an honor to the donors, individually and/or as a certain 
group. The goal of this kind of forced donation, according to the government, besides 
to help people in need, is to arouse people’s fraternal love to each other, and to 
cultivate the kindness or benevolence to help each other. Usually, students’ 
engagement in a forced donation is viewed by teachers as an indication of their 
morality. As a result, students may donate, though involuntarily or reluctantly, in 
order to gain a good score in their moral assessments. Since students donate 
involuntarily, forced donation may fail to cultivate voluntary virtue in students.  
Based on Aristotle’s argument on voluntary virtue, he would suggest a cautious 
attitude towards forced donation, a particular means of habituation. First of all, for 
Aristotle, habituation can cultivate both virtue and vice in people. Through forced 
donation, students’ resistance to being forced to do something, even to do the good 
deeds, may be intensified. Consequently, it is possible that students also resist certain 
virtues, such as fraternal love or sacrifice that are bonded with forced donation, due to 
students’ resistance to forced donation. That is, rather than being habituated to be 
virtuous, students may possess some unacceptable character traits contrary to these 
virtues. In this sense, forced donation may not be a good approach to cultivate 
voluntary virtue. In addition, because forced donation always involves external forces, 
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many students are moved by external moving principles rather than a moving 
principle in a person. According to Aristotle, voluntary virtue is based on moving 
principles in a person. In this sense, it may deserve some considerations on how to 
replace external moving principles with internal ones when applying forced donation, 
which is an issue that attracts little attention in Mainland China.  
As a result, maybe it is time to ask ourselves, “What do we want students to gain 
through moral education?” “Do we want students to provide the ‘correct’ answers like 
a repeating machine without processing them?” “Do we want students to exercise 
virtuous actions without being virtuous?” Or, “Do we care about students’ virtuous 
performance out of school?” If we Chinese educators have opportunities to think 
about these questions, we might find potential problems in our teaching approaches 
and assessments of morality. Considering the political atmospheres and the 
test-oriented educational system in Mainland China, it may be very difficult to change 
teaching approaches and assessments of moral education from top to bottom. 
However, there is some possible space that teachers can make towards improvement. 
For instance, rather than focusing on rote memorization of “correct” morality, 
teachers may encourage students to develop their capacities of moral reasoning 
through class arguments and assignments. Also, if teachers have to engage students 
into forced donation, maybe teachers can apply it in a less forced way. For instance, 
maybe teachers can stop persuading and pushing students, although in this case 
teachers themselves may have to take pressure from school board and peers. These 
kinds of change by teachers may be limited; however, it may still increase the 
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possibilities to shift our focus from students’ virtuous performance to the cultivation 
of voluntary virtue.  
3. Some Considerations on the Teaching of Self-interest in Mainland China  
    Self-interest and common interest are emphasized as important content in 
morality courses in Mainland China. Self-interest is generally taught as a negative 
concept in the Chinese context. Students are taught that self-interest fundamentally 
conflicts with common interest; it is always appropriate to sacrifice one’s self-interest 
to common interest, when they conflict with each other. Moreover, students are taught 
that they should be self-restrained, that is, to restrain themselves from excessive or 
inappropriate desires, which are based on excessive concern for self-interest. Both 
Aristotle’s and Marx’s views on self-interest give us some clues to reexamine the 
teaching of self-interest in Mainland China.  
    First of all, rather than assertively imposing on students the idea that concern of 
self-interest is selfish or egoist, it would be worthy of teachers’ considering how to 
teach students to distinguish appropriate self-interest and egoism. Both Aristotle and 
Marx justify appropriate self-interest, which is positive to human beings. Since moral 
education in Mainland China is based on Marxism, it would be relatively safe and less 
challenging for teachers to introduce Marx’s own views of self-interest to students. 
The relevant content of self-interest in morality textbooks is presupposed to be based 
on Marxism; however, the content may represent a misunderstanding of Marxism. As 
a result, teachers may introduce to students, for instance, Marx’s views of self-interest, 
his justification of self-interest in particular, in order to help students understand the 
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distinction between self-interest and egoism. Also, teachers may introduce students to 
Marx’s argument that self-interest and common interest mutually shape each other. In 
this way, students may find out that self-interest and common interest can be 
advanced at the same time, they do not necessarily conflict with each other, as 
morality textbooks suggest. Marx’s thoughts of self-interest are much richer than what 
is illustrated in morality textbooks in Mainland China. Teachers may make their own 
decisions regarding which of Marx’s ideas of self-interest to be included in classes. 
    In addition, Chinese teachers may also consider encouraging arguments and 
debates in their classes. Since moral education in Mainland China is based on the only 
“correct” view of morality, the only “correctness” implies that there is always a 
correct way to resolve moral issues. As a result, arguments or debates based on ethical 
issues seldom appear in morality classes. However, life is more complicated than just 
right or wrong; sometimes moral principles provided in textbooks may not solve all 
moral problems. For instance, according to morality textbooks, self-interest should 
always give priority to common interest. Consider the following case. Suppose a 
group of people are on a sinking ship, and there is not enough lifeboat room for 
everyone. Suppose everyone tends to act in the best interest of self, then how to 
arrange the lifeboat? In this fictional scenario, sacrificing self-interest for common 
interest is not the key point. Rather, people on the ship need to determine on what 
standard someone deserves life opportunities more than others.  
    In the Chinese contest, theoretically, if there are communists on the ship, they 
should first let others take their position in the lifeboat. But besides this standard, 
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what other standards could we have? Gender? Age? Personal achievement? Why or 
why not? All these questions may inspire students’ moral thinking about self-interest. 
Given the complexity of moral issues, it may be worthy of encouraging arguments 
and debates on moral issue in class in order to broaden students’ moral visions and to 
develop their moral reasoning.  
    Finally, it is worthy of us to reconsider self-restraint, which is a particular virtue 
related to self-interest and is valued in Mainland China. In the Chinese context, if one 
can restrain oneself from inappropriate desires and actions, this person is usually 
viewed as noble and virtuous. There is a Chinese maxim that those who do not have 
any selfish desires are the strongest people (wu yu ze gang). Another Chinese saying 
is that one would be happy if one does not have excessive desires and is satisfied with 
what one has (zhi zu chang le). It seems that in the Chinese context, the fewer 
personal desires one has, the better and nobler one might be. Self-restraint is taught as 
an important virtue in school to abstain from inappropriate desires or actions. Students 
are taught to restrain themselves from private desires, and dedicate themselves to the 
collectivism.  
    If one is well self-restrained, one may avoid irrational actions based on excessive 
or inappropriate desires. In this sense, self-restraint may be a good character trait. 
However, in many Chinese schools, self-restraint may be overemphasized. For 
instance, without teachers’ permission, students are not allowed to talk or move in 
class. They are required to sit steadily all day long. Also, they are restrained from 
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their personal thoughts, if those thoughts are not consistent to the “correct” view4. 
Aristotle, although he also identifies self-control as a virtue, may remind us to 
consider “To what degree one restrains oneself would contribute to happiness?” Marx, 
who rejects the idea of desire control, may remind us to question “Why should we 
control this or that desire?” These two questions may deserve our consideration, when 
we attempt to cultivate self-restraint in students. Teachers may increase their tolerance 
to students’ certain utterance or behaviors. 
4. Summary 
    In this chapter, I provide suggestions to reconsider the teaching of happiness in 
Mainland China, based on the inspirations from Aristotle’s and Marx’s views. 
Generally, there are two aspects of teaching of happiness that may deserve our 
thinking. One is that it is worthy of us to introduce other views of happiness besides 
the Marxist one in class; also, it may benefit students by teaching them a 
comprehensive understanding of happiness rather than the only “correct” one. The 
other aspect is about pedagogy. It may be worthy of us to involve other teaching 
approaches to teach happiness and morality. For instance, we may encourage, or at 
least tolerate, students’ arguments and debates on moral issues. Also, it would be 
worthy of us to reconsider the ways we assess morality and virtue. However, given 
the political atmosphere and the test-oriented educational system in Mainland China, 
it may be very challenging for Chinese teachers to do so.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
4	   For	  instance,	  a	  student	  would	  get	  zero	  point	  in	  essays	  of	  paper	  tests,	  if	  the	  student	  demonstrates	  an	  “incorrect”	  
view	  in	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  essay.	  In	  this	  way,	  students	  are	  restrained	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  view	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CHAPTER 6: SUMMARY 
    In this dissertation, I examine the teaching of happiness, an important part of 
moral education, in Mainland China. My examination centers on the following three 
aspect of happiness education there: 
    1) What is happiness and what contributes to happiness? 
    2) What is the significance of voluntary virtue in moral education? 
    3) What is the relationship between self-interest and happiness? 
My analysis is based on Aristotle’s and Marx views of these three questions. For 
Aristotle, happiness is the highest good of human beings; it is an activity of the soul in 
accordance with virtue. As a result, Aristotle believes that in order to achieve 
happiness, people should be habituated to moral virtues. Also, he insists that 
voluntary virtue contributes more to happiness than involuntary virtue. In addition, 
Aristotle believes that both advancement and sacrifice of self-interest can contribute 
to happiness, but they should be kept in an appropriate degree, for instance the mean 
degree according to Aristotle.  
    In contrast, for Marx, happiness is a particular good of human beings, but it is 
not higher than other goods, such as freedom and self-realization of human essence. 
Rather, Marx suggests that communism is the highest good, because it the 
precondition of other goods. In addition, Marx believes that voluntary labor 
contributes to happiness, while involuntary labor leads to unhappiness. Regarding 
whether voluntary virtue contributes to happiness, Marx does not give a direct answer. 
Given his rejection to morality and virtue, he tends to answer “No,” because he 
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believes that morality or virtue can be used as a means of ruling. Furthermore, Marx 
agrees with Aristotle that self-interest can be positive to human beings. Also, Marx 
values sacrifice of self-interest, but he believes that only in a communist society 
everyone can be selfless and first concerned for others’ interests. 
    Based on the comparison and analysis of Aristotle’s and Marx’s view of these 
issues, I make suggestions for us Chinese educators to reconsider our teaching of 
happiness in Mainland China. First of all, it would be worthy of us to involve other 
views of happiness and morality besides the Marxist view in class. Different views 
may contribute to a comprehensive understanding of happiness; also, it may 
contribute to students’ practice of pursuing happiness. Moreover, it may be worthy of 
us to engage families and communities to participate in the redesign of morality 
courses. Second, it would be worthy of considering how to cultivate voluntary virtue 
in students, besides habituating them to virtuous actions. I use forced donation as an 
example to illustrate that moral education in Mainland China focuses on virtuous 
performance rather than voluntary virtue. I argue moral education that ignores 
voluntary virtue may be incomplete. As a result, I suggest that we Chinese educators 
work together to develop new approaches to cultivate and to assess morality or virtue. 
Finally, I suggest that it is worthy of considering how to teach self-interest based on 
involvement of different views and methods. 
    The teaching of happiness in Mainland China is a big issue. It is impossible for 
me to cover every aspect of that topic in this dissertation. There are several main 
inadequacies in this dissertation, which need further investigation. First of all, there 
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are many valuable philosophical thoughts of happiness and/or morality, such as the 
Kantian view, the utilitarian view, and so forth. However, my analysis is mainly based 
on Aristotle’s and Marx’s views of happiness. Other views besides the two 
philosophers’ may inspire me to reexamine the teaching of happiness in Mainland 
China, from other perspectives, which may contribute more to a holistic view of this 
issue.  
    Second, I involve several of Confucius’ thoughts regarding happiness in Chapter 
1. However, I do not provide an extensive analysis based on the Confucian view. A 
possible reason for this is that Confucianism was replaced, marginalized, and 
suppressed, when communism became the dominant ideology, educational ideology 
in particular, in Mainland China. However, considering Confucianism’s influence and 
its recent potential reviving in Mainland China, further work may be needed to 
explore Confucius’ influence on moral education in Mainland China. 
    Finally, in this dissertation, I focus on the teaching of happiness. I do not explore 
what we Chinese educators teach happiness for. Personally, I believe that we teach 
happiness and morality for a happy life. However, according to the Chinese 
government, the ultimate goal of moral education, happiness education in particular, 
is to cultivate qualified and reliable “socialist/communist successors5.”  Based on the 
government guidance documents, happiness is not the ultimate end of human beings. I 
believe that the philosophical foundation of moral education or happiness education 
deserves more examinations, but I purposefully skip this topic in this dissertation. 
“How to teach for happiness” may be an interesting and important issue to examine in 
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the future. 
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